Security of multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks by unknown
Ph.D. in Electronic and Computer Engineering
Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
University of Cagliari
Security of Multimodal Biometric
Systems against Spoof Attacks
By
Zahid Akhtar
Advisor
Prof. Fabio Roli
Co-Advisors
Dr. Giorgio Fumera
Dr. Gian Luca Marcialis
XXIV Cycle
March 2012

Ph.D. in Electronic and Computer Engineering
Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
University of Cagliari
Security of Multimodal Biometric
Systems against Spoof Attacks
By
Zahid Akhtar
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
University of Cagliari
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Electronic and Computer Engineering
XXIV Cycle
March 2012

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and above all, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to God, the
merciful and the guardian, for blessing me with the physical, mental, and finan-
cial strength to conclude my PhD studies successfully.
I owe my deepest gratitude to my advisor, mentor, and motivator Prof. Fabio
Roli for providing me the research opportunity in challenging and exciting fields
of pattern recognition and biometrics. His dedication, acute perception, atten-
tion to details, commitment to quality, quest for perfection, and thirst for nov-
elty have been true inspirations to my research and personal life. His frequent
invitation of the eminent researchers for the talks and engagement in the brain-
storming sessions were of great help in widening the horizons and honing my
research skills. I am deeply indebted to him for guidance and suggestions that
made my Ph. D. studies a memorable experience.
I am extremely grateful to Dr. Giorgio Fumera for his uncomparable co-
guidance and his continuous encouragement, support and help throughout all
the obstacles and setbacks. He has enriched my view in research topics and
taught me different aspects like how to conduct effective and efficient research,
how to present and write a technical article, just to name a few. I am obliged to
him for his tremendously thoughtful suggestions and guidance for my work and
successful completion of this thesis. Many thanks to Dr. Gian Luca Marcialis
for his timely guidance, suggestions, discussions and assistance in writing re-
search papers. I would also thank Dr. Giorgio Giacinto and Dr. Luca Didaci for
their support and aid whenever requested.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. (Mrs.) D. C. Gharpure,
University of Pune, for her timely guidance, motivation and giving the first
time opportunity for me to carry out research in image processing and pattern
recognition. I am eternally grateful to Dr. D. G. Kanhere, University of Pune,
for motivating and helping me to come to Italy for higher studies.
vii
I would like to thank Dr. Davide Ariu, Dr. Battista Biggio, Dr. Igino Corona,
Dr. Luca Piras, Dr. Ignazio Pillai, Dr. Roberto Tronci, Dr. Biagio Freni,
Daniele Muntoni, Massimiliano Dibitonto, Riccardo Satta, Zisis Bimpisidis, Dr.
Jose Antonio Iglesias, Simone Sini, Paolo Denti, Luca Ghiani, Valerio Mura,
Alessandro Fanti, Abdel Wassie, Shahzad Barkati, Sandeep Kale, Mohammad
Rizwan, Dr. Arunkumar Walunj, Sudip Chakraborty and all my colleagues in
India and Italy for their excellent support, discussion and jaunts during this
period.
I would like to give very special thanks to Nasir Alfarid for his support
throughout the thick and thin times and giving me advice, inspiration and mo-
tivation to achieve the best in personal and professional life, and Dr. Ajita
Rattani for numerous interesting and entertaining discussions, suggestions, in-
sights, and help.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents and all my family members for
their unconditional love, support, encouragement, timely counsel and prayers.
It is to them that I dedicate, everything that I am and all that is to come.
Abstract
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system being used in ad-
versarial environment. Since, biometric system like any conventional security
system is exposed to malicious adversaries, who can manipulate data to make
the system ineffective by compromising its integrity. Current theory and de-
sign methods of biometric systems do not take into account the vulnerability
to such adversary attacks. Therefore, evaluation of classical design methods is
an open problem to investigate whether they lead to design secure systems. In
order to make biometric systems secure it is necessary to understand and evalu-
ate the threats and to thus develop effective countermeasures and robust system
designs, both technical and procedural, if necessary. Accordingly, the extension
of theory and design methods of biometric systems is mandatory to safeguard
the security and reliability of biometric systems in adversarial environments. In
this thesis, we provide some contributions towards this direction.
Among all the potential attacks discussed in the literature, spoof attacks are
one of the main threats against the security of biometric systems for identity
recognition. Multimodal biometric systems are commonly believed to be in-
trinsically more robust to spoof attacks than systems based on a single biomet-
ric trait, as they combine information coming from different biometric traits.
However, recent works have question such belief and shown that multimodal
systems can be misled by an attacker (impostor) even by spoofing only one of
the biometric traits. Therefore, we first provide a detailed review of state-of-the-
art works in multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks. The scope of
state-of-the-art results is very limited, since they were obtained under a very
restrictive “worst-case” hypothesis, where the attacker is assumed to be able to
fabricate a perfect replica of a biometric trait whose matching score distribu-
tion is identical to the one of genuine traits. Thus, we argue and investigate
the validity of “worst-case” hypothesis using large set of real spoof attacks and
provide empirical evidence that “worst-case” scenario can not be representa-
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tive of real spoof attacks: its suitability may depend on the specific biometric
trait, the matching algorithm, and the techniques used to counterfeit the spoofed
traits. Then, we propose a security evaluation methodology of biometric sys-
tems against spoof attacks that can be used in real applications, as it does not
require fabricating fake biometric traits, it allows the designer to take into ac-
count the different possible qualities of fake traits used by different attackers,
and it exploits only information on genuine and impostor samples which is col-
lected for the training of a biometric system. Our methodology evaluates the
performances under a simulated spoof attack using model of the fake score dis-
tribution that takes into account explicitly different degrees of the quality of fake
biometric traits. In particular, we propose two models of the match score distri-
bution of fake traits that take into account all different factors which can affect
the match score distribution of fake traits like the particular spoofed biometric,
the sensor, the algorithm for matching score computation, the technique used
to construct fake biometrics, and the skills of the attacker. All these factors are
summarized in a single parameter, that we call “attack strength”. Further, we
propose extension of our security evaluation method to rank several biometric
score fusion rules according to their relative robustness against spoof attacks.
This method allows the designer to choose the most robust rule according to
the method prediction. We then present empirical analysis, using data sets of
face and fingerprints including real spoofed traits, to show that our proposed
models provide a good approximation of fake traits’ score distribution and our
method thus providing an adequate estimation of the security1 of biometric sys-
tems against spoof attacks. We also use our method to show how to evaluate
the security of different multimodal systems on publicly available benchmark
data sets without spoof attacks. Our experimental results show that robustness
of multimodal biometric systems to spoof attacks strongly depends on the par-
ticular matching algorithm, the score fusion rule, and the attack strength of fake
traits. We eventually present evidence, considering a multimodal system based
on face and fingerprint biometrics, that the proposed methodology to rank score
fusion rules is capable of providing correct ranking of score fusion rules under
spoof attacks.
1In this thesis, we will use both “security” and “robustness” terms interchangeably, to indicate performance of
biometric systems against attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We human beings have an innate ability to recognize, identify, and categorize
objects in a seemingly efficient, fast and effortless fashion. For instance, a child
can recognize easily his best friend in a picture without experiencing any prob-
lem. Since the recognition process occurs subliminally, hence it is hard even
for the computer scientists in conventional research paradigms to translate this
process into a computer algorithm as accurate as human being. In other words,
it is neither possible to explain nor to perceive meticulously how the recognition
process works. However, Alan Turing (1912-1954), who is widely considered
to be the father of modern computer science and artificial intelligence, thought
that future had already arrived and in a couple of years machines would be able
to think and act automatically such as understanding verbal languages or read-
ing handwritten character (letter or number) and so forth. In a point of fact,
these are still open research issues and very challenging tasks for researchers
and computer scientists in the areas of pattern recognition and machine learn-
ing.
Pattern recognition or pattern classification can be defined as “the act of tak-
ing in raw data and taking an action based on the category of the pattern” [17].
Pattern recognition techniques are currently used in several security applica-
tions such as biometrics based person recognition, spam filtering, and intrusion
detection in computer networks, with the goal to discriminate between a ‘legit-
imate’ and a ‘malicious’ pattern class. For example, genuine or impostor users
in biometric systems. However, these tasks are different from classical pattern
recognition tasks, since intelligent and adaptive adversaries (human beings) can
manipulate their samples to defeat the system. For instance, biometric spoof
attack using fake fingerprints. Since, classical pattern recognition techniques
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
do not take into account the adversarial nature of classification problems like
the one mentioned above, they therefore exhibit significant performance degra-
dation when used in adversarial settings, namely under attacks. For instance, in
the following we quote a sentence from [18], related to the security of biometric
systems.
“It is possible to have a system that is extremely accurate at dis-
tinguishing the correct person under normal conditions, but which is
highly vulnerable to simple methods used to circumvent the security”.
Therefore, pattern recognition techniques have to take into account the pres-
ence of malicious adversaries, explicitly at design phase, to improve the security
of the systems.
1.1 Adversarial Pattern Classification
Pattern classification is the scientific discipline whose goal is to classify the
objects (samples) into a number of classes or categories. Depending on the type
of application, these objects (commonly referred as patterns) may be any type of
measurements, images or signal waveforms that need to be classified. In pattern
classification, typically a set of patterns (the raw data), whose class is unknown,
is given. The objective is then to devise an algorithm that assigns such patterns
to one of the (possibly predetermined) classes, using some prior information.
In addition, proper actions can be taken based on the outcome of the pattern
classification. For instance, in fingerprint based high security access control
system, when the impostor is detected, the system may decided to ring the alarm
bell. A wide variety of pattern recognition, typically known as classification
algorithms or classifiers, have been proposed for many classification tasks.
Traditionally, a classifier is designed by training it on a set of patterns (sam-
ples or feature vectors) whose true class is known– referred also as training set
or design set, to find a classification function. When a pattern has to be classi-
fied, the classifier utilizes the acquired knowledge to assign the class to a given
input pattern. The capability of the classifier, designed using the training data
set, to operate satisfactorily with data outside training set is known as classifier’s
generalization capability.
The classification function can be estimated by either supervised (classifica-
tion) learning or unsupervised (clustering) learning, the first one involves only
labeled data (training patterns with known class labels) while the latter involves
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Figure 1.1: The basic stages involved in the design of a pattern classification system.
only unlabeled data. To date, many classification algorithms have been pro-
posed in the literature, such as bayesian classifiers, neural networks, support
vector machines (SVMs), decision trees and k-nearest neighbor classifiers, just
to name a few. Indeed, it is clear from the literature that there is no best classi-
fier for all types of problem. However, the simplest strategy could be to select
the best performing classifier on the task at hand.
Figure 1.1 shows the various stages followed for the design of a pattern clas-
sification system. The first step is to collect a pre-processed set of training sam-
ples. The role of data pre-processing module is therefore to segment the pattern
of interest from the background, remove noise and any other operation which
will contribute in defining a compact representation of the pattern. Features are
then extracted from each training sample. In practice, a larger than necessary
number of feature candidates is generated and then the best of them is adopted.
The classifier, which is chosen among different algorithms, is trained on ap-
propriate features. Finally, once the classifier has been designed (trained), one
can evaluate the performance of the designed classifier (i.e., what is the classi-
fication error rate) on test set, namely prediction of classifier’s behavior on the
unseen samples that were not present in the training set, and whose class la-
bels are unknown as well. The feedback path allows one to go back, depending
on the results, to redesign the preceding stages in order to improve the overall
performance.
We have already pointed out that pattern classification techniques have been
greatly implicated in several security application (e.g. biometrics) to overcome
the shortcomings of classical security systems. The current surge of interest
in pattern classification for security applications, however, raises a vital issue:
“are pattern classification techniques themselves secure?”. Pattern classifica-
tion systems themselves in principle can be circumvented by a malicious adver-
sary. In particular, attacks can be devised at any stage of the system (see Figure
1.2). For instance, a biometric recognition system can be attacked by an ac-
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Figure 1.2: Adversaries may exploit different vulnerabilities at any stage of a pattern recognition
system (adapted from [7]). Thus, the system designers should look for such vulnerabilities in
advance, and propose specific countermeasures.
curate three-dimensional model of a fake fingerprint belonging to a legitimate
user. In general, it is necessary to identify and understand the threat (attack)
points of a pattern classification system when used in adversarial environments,
so that effective technical and procedural countermeasures can be proposed.
Another significant issue that emerged as a consequence of the application
of classification techniques in security tasks is related to the performance eval-
uation of classifiers. The traditional approaches of classifier performance eval-
uation may give a too optimistic estimate of the real performance, since they
are carried out using data set that does not contain attack samples at all, or
which may contain attack samples which however were not targeted against the
system. Thereby, they do not provide robustness estimate of a classifier under
attacks. For instance, a biometric recognition system is generally not tested
against spoof attacks. Hence, we can say that the system which is more ro-
bust under attacks may be a better choice with respect to the system which is
more accurate according to the standard performance evaluation methods, since
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the performance of latter one may drop faster than former one due to attacks.
In general, the design of robust pattern classification systems, namely design-
ing of systems having optimal trade-off between accuracy and robustness under
attacks, is itself an open issue.
Since, pattern classification techniques were not originally thought to be op-
erating in adversarial settings, thus in classical approaches they are not explic-
itly designed from the scratch to be secure to address the issues like vulnerabil-
ity identification, performance evaluation, and design of robust classifiers. At
least in principle, the design process of a pattern classification system should
consider explicitly the presence of malicious adversaries at any stage: ranging
from data acquisition to classification, including feature extraction and selec-
tion, and performance evaluation. This approach, as shown in Figure 1.2, is
usually referred to as security by design in security engineering.
In this thesis, we thoroughly investigate the open issues raised from the appli-
cation of pattern recognition systems in adversarial environments in the context
of biometric recognition systems.
1.2 Biometrics
We all human beings use our natural abilities to recognize an individual through
their face, voice, gait and other characteristics. Whereas, computers require
programming algorithms in order to recognize an individual using the same
observable information. Technological advances are promising to close the
gap between human perception and computer recognition. Especially, biomet-
rics which relies on measuring a variety of anatomical, physiological and be-
havioural characteristics and matching to measurements that were previously
collected from the person, thus recognizing him using distinctive personal traits
such as fingerprint, face, voice and so forth. For instance, fingerprint based
recognition system, the person must place his finger on a fingerprint sensor
whenever he wants to log in. The sensor will capture the fingerprint image
he provides and will then match it to previously collected fingerprint measure-
ments. If the latest fingerprint measurement matches closely enough, the system
acknowledges that the genuine person is present and logs him in or grants him
access. It is worth noting that the person has no device to lose or password to
forget: he can authenticate himself as long as his fingerprint (biometrics char-
acteristics) hasn’t been badly injured or degraded. Biometrics thus can provide
one of the most substial benefits to the security arena in guarding against at-
tempts to establish fraudulent multiple identities or prevent identity fraud. As,
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biometrics can not be shared due to being an intrinsic property of an individual,
therefore making it possible to know automatically who did ‘what’, ‘where’
and ‘when’. Anyway, the principal goal of the use of biometrics is to attain the
capability of accurately recognizing individuals with greater reliability, conve-
nience, speed and lower cost.
Depending on the context, a biometric system can be used either in a ver-
ification mode or an identification mode. In verification (Am I who I claim I
am?) mode, a person’s claimed identity is confirmed based upon validating a
sample collected against a previously collected biometric sample for that indi-
vidual. On the other hand, in identification (Am I who I claim I am? or Who
am I?) mode, the system has to recognize a person based upon comparison of
biometrics collected against a database of previously collected samples of N
individuals.
Unimodal biometric systems [48] perform person recognition based on a sin-
gle source of biometric information, e.g., single fingerprint or face. These sys-
tems are contended with problems like noise in sensed data, non-universality,
lack of individuality of the chosen biometric trait, absence of an invariant rep-
resentation for the biometric trait and susceptibility to circumvention. Some
of the limitations imposed by unimodal biometric systems can be alleviated by
using multimodal biometric systems [76] that consolidate evidence from multi-
ple biometric sources. For example, a multimodal biometric system could be a
combination of iris recognition and fingerprint recognition to confirm the iden-
tity of a user. The integration of two or more types of biometric information
sources, which basically takes advantage of the proficiency of each individual
biometric, helps to meet stringent performance requirements, reliability and ro-
bustness against attacks. It is worth noting that multimodal biometrics systems
are progressively becoming common in biometric applications deployment.
In a multimodal biometric system information fusion can take place at differ-
ent levels: sensor level, feature level, score level, rank level and decision level.
These levels of fusion can be broadly categorized into fusion prior to match-
ing and fusion after matching. Fusion at the score level, which is also adopted
in this thesis, is the most common approach since it offers the best trade-off
between the information content and the ease in fusion.
As a general rule, if a biometric system is made by human beings, it can be
defeated by human beings. Since, biometric traits are not secret, hence they can
be captured, copied and replayed. For instance, we human beings often leave
measurable traces of our biometric traits wherever we go, like fingerprints on
surfaces, the recorded sound of voice, or even video records of face and body.
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This “latency” provides a way for attackers to generate a bogus biometric trait
and use it to trick the system into thinking that the genuine user is actually
present. Moreover, it may be possible to intercept a legitimate biometric trait
collected from genuine user and replay it later. This act of submitting an artifact
to a biometric system, where a person pretends to be another person, in order to
fool the system is known as spoof attack [36, 78].
Among all the possible threats, spoof attack is a fatal threat for biometric
authentication systems. Spoof attacks have a great practical relevance because
they don’t require advanced technical skills and, therefore, the potential number
of attackers is very large. The classical countermeasure against spoof attacks
is “liveness” or “vitality” detection [43, 78], which aims at detecting physio-
logical signs of life in the biomsetric trait, using hardware devices embedded
into the sensor or signal processing algorithms, to ensure that a sample is being
acquired from live human being and not simply a prosthetic one.
Multimodal biometric systems, apart from liveness detection methods, are
also considered a natural anti-spoofing technique. It is commonly believed that
multimodal systems are more robust to spoof attacks than unimodal systems.
This claim was done on the basis of the intuitive assumption, rather than on
any theoretical or empirical evidence, that the intruder needs to spoof all fused
biometric traits simultaneously to evade them [78, 34].
However, recent works have questioned the security of multimodal biometric
systems against spoof attacks. It has been shown empirically that multimodal
systems can be cracked by spoofing only one of the biometric traits. However,
This result was obtained under a restrictive “worst-case” scenario, where the
attacker is able to perfectly replicate a genuine biometric trait whose matching
score distribution is identical to the one of genuine traits. Thereby, this raises
the issue of investigating more thoroughly the security of multimodal biomet-
ric systems against spoof attacks and devising new methods to design robust
systems against them, which is still an open issue.
To sum up, in this section we introduced the biometrics and it’s major issue
of security against spoof attacks, which will be described in the next two chap-
ters in detail. In this thesis, we thoroughly investigate the open issues raised
from the application of biometric recognition systems in such adversarial en-
vironments. We in fact propose different techniques to address the problem
of performance evaluation of biometric systems under adversarial settings. We
summarize our contributions in the next section.
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1.3 Outline and Goals of this Thesis
In the previous sections, we provided an overview of pattern classification, ad-
versarial pattern classification and biometrics. We also pointed out the security
issues of pattern recognition techniques in adversarial environments, which are
thoroughly discussed and investigated in the following chapters in the context
of multimodal biometric systems. The main contributions of this thesis are
summarized below.
• We first provide a state-of-the-art of works on multimodal biometric sys-
tems in adversarial settings. In particular, we present a review of spoof
attacks on multimodal biometric systems according to the main issues,
namely,
◦ identifying vulnerabilities of multimodal biometric systems to spoof
attacks, which can be exploited by an attacker to make them ineffec-
tive;
◦ evaluating the security of multimodal biometric systems against spoof
attacks;
◦ designing of robust multimodal biometric systems against spoof at-
tacks.
Multimodal biometric systems are commonly believed to be more robust to
spoof attacks than unimodal systems. However, the review shows, contrary
to a common belief, that a multimodal biometric system can be evaded by
an impostor even by spoofing only one biometric trait. Nevertheless, this
conclusion was obtained under a stringent hypothesis of a “worst-case”
attack, where the attacker is able to replicate perfectly the genuine bio-
metric traits, which was obtained by simulation under consideration that
the matching score distribution of fake traits is identical to the one of gen-
uine users. This hypothesis also allows one to evaluate the robustness of
multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks without the need of
actual fabrication of fake biometric traits. A substantial increase of the
false acceptance rate (FAR) of multimodal systems under spoof attacks
was indeed highlighted. Thus, these results raise the issue of investigat-
ing more thoroughly the security of multimodal systems against real spoof
attacks, namely their performance degradation in the non-worst case sce-
nario when the attacker is not able to fabricate exact replica of genuine
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biometric traits and devising accordingly new methods to design robust
systems against attacks, which is still an open issue.
• We then investigate the vulnerability of multimodal biometric systems to
real spoof attacks in accordance with the common beliefs about its robust-
ness to attacks.
Such empirical evaluation allow us to address open issues such as to what
extent the drop of performance under the “worst-case” attack scenario is
representative of the performance under real spoof attacks, whether multi-
modal systems can be more robust than each corresponding unimodal sys-
tems, even in the case when all biometric traits are spoofed and whether
multimodal systems can be cracked by spoofing all the fused traits, even
when the attacker is not able to fabricate exact replicas of the genuine
user’s traits.
• Next, we propose a general methodology to evaluate the security of bio-
metric systems against spoof attacks.
A straightforward approach to evaluate the security of a biometric system
against spoof attacks could be to fabricate fake biometric traits and present
them to the system. However, constructing fake biometric traits exhibit-
ing various quality degrees is cumbersome and impractical task. We thus
propose a security evaluation method that does not require fabrication of
fake traits. This method evaluates the security under a simulated spoof
attack using models of the fake score distribution that take into account
explicitly also scenarios more realistic than the worst-case one, namely
different degrees of the quality of fake biometric traits. The main feature
of the method is that it can be applied to any multimodal system, namely,
to any set of matchers combined with any score fusion rule, and it allows
to simulate a spoof attack against any subset of the component matchers.
• We eventually propose extension of our security evaluation method to rank
the biometric fusion rules according to their robustness against attacks.
The main objective is to rank the several state-of-the-art score level fusion
rules according to their relative robustness against attacks. This can pro-
vide information to the designer of a multimodal system to choose a score
fusion rule, taking also into account its robustness to attacks.
This thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, we introduce bio-
metrics together with its challenges and limitations. In addition, we also present
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an insight to unimodal and multimodal biometric systems. In Chapter 3, we
closely analyze the problem of attacks on biometric systems, and report a crit-
ical review of state-of-the-art works on multimodal biometric systems against
attacks. In Chapter 4, we experimentally evaluated the performance of multi-
modal biometric systems against real spoof attacks, namely its vulnerability to
spoof attacks. In Chapter 5, we describe the proposed methodologies, first to
evaluate the performance of biometric systems against spoof attacks and second
to rank biometric fusion rules under attacks. Subsequently, an extensive exper-
imental analysis is also reported. Concluding remarks and new open research
issues are eventually discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Biometric Systems
2.1 Introduction
The need for dependable identity management system has expanded in the wake
of enhanced concerns about security and to combat the exponential growth in
identity theft. Conventional methods to establish the identity of a persons are
knowledge-based security: “what you know”, such as password, personal iden-
tification, and token-based (possession-based) security: “what you have”, like
ID card, physical key. However, surrogate representation of identity like pass-
words can be easily divulged using dictionary attacks [44] and social engineer-
ing [60], and ID cards can be misplaced, shared or stolen [41] by an impostor
to gain unauthorized access, thus defeating the system security. In addition,
significant authentication tasks such as detecting multiple enrollments and non-
repudiation can’t be attained by password- or ID card-based authentication sys-
tems. Thus, reliable and user-friendly identity management systems with ro-
bust authentication techniques based on “who you are”, namely biometrics, are
needed.
Biometric systems substantiate the identity of a person using his biologi-
cal or behavioral characteristics such as face, fingerprint, iris, palmprint, hand
geometry, voice, signature, and gait etc., which are also known as biometric
modalities or traits. Some of the most widely used biometric traits by the iden-
tity management systems are shown in Figure 2.1.
The prime advantage of biometric systems compared to conventional iden-
tification methods is replacing “what the person carries” and “what the person
remembers” paradigms with “who the person is”, thus preventing identity fraud
by using biometrics patterns that are claimed to be unique, permanent and hard
11
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Figure 2.1: Examples of the physiological and behavioural body traits that can be used for
biometric recognition.
to forge. Since, the person is required to be present at the time of the authen-
tication by the biometric system, thus also preventing false repudiation claims.
In order to combat increasing security threats in information era, governments,
industries and academies have largely adopted and encouraged research on bio-
metric authentication systems. The most well-known large scale biometric sys-
tems are US-VISIT program [85], the Schiphol Privium scheme at Amsterdam’s
Schiphol airport [88], the fingerprint based biometric system at Disney World,
Orlando [31] and Atuomated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) [87].
2.2 Basic Structure of a Biometric System
A generic biometric system consists of five main modules: a sensor module; a
quality assessment and feature extraction module; a matching module; Decision
making module; a system database module, as described below.
1. Sensor module: A suitable biometric sensor/scanner is applied to attain
the raw biometric data of an individual. For instance, an optical sensor can
be used to acquire the fingerprint images by capturing the friction ridge
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structure of the finger. Since, sensor module determines the interaction of
the human with the system, thus playing a pivotal role in the performance
of the biometric systems.
2. Quality assessment and feature extraction module: A quality assess-
ment algorithm is used, in order to determine the suitability of the biomet-
ric data for the subsequent processing. If the quality is inadequate then
the biometric sample is rejected and reacquired. If the quality assessment
algorithm is not incorporated then the acquired data is subject to signal en-
hancement algorithm to improve it’s quality. The biometric sample is then
processed to glean a set of salient discriminatory features. The extracted
feature set procured during enrollment is stored in the database, referred
as template, thereby constituting the identity of an individual.
3. Matching module: To verify the identity of an individual, the extracted
feature set from the biometric sample (known as query or input or probe)
is compared against the enrolled template to generate the match score,
which determines the amount of similarity (similarity score) or distance
(distance score) between the two feature sets. The system conducts a one-
to-one comparison to verify a claimed identity, while the comparison is
one-to-many to determine an identity.
4. Decision making module: Decision making module uses match score, to
validate a claimed identity in the verification task or to provide a ranking
of the enrolled identities to identify an individual in the identification task.
In order to determine the authenticity of an individual, generally, the match
score is compared to a predefined threshold. The identity of an individual
is verified successfully, if the match score of the query is equal or higher
than the threshold for “similarity score”, while equal or lower for “distance
score”.
5. System database module: The system database, which acts as the deposi-
tory of biometric information, is used to store the extracted feature set from
the raw biometric sample (i.e., template), along with some biographic in-
formation (such as name, Personal Identification Number (PIN), address,
etc.) characterizing an individual.
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2.3 Verification and Identification
Depending on the application context, a biometric system may operate in the
following two modes: verification mode or identification mode.
2.3.1 Verification mode
In the verification mode, the system validates the authenticity of a claimed iden-
tity by comparing the captured biometric data with her own biometric template
stored in the system database, thus conducting a one-to-one comparison to de-
termine whether the claim is true or not. Verification can be posed as the follow-
ing two class classification problem: if the degree of similarity betwen the input
sample and template of the claimed identity is above a predefined threshold,
then the claim is classified as “genuine”. Otherwise, the claim is rejected and
the user is considered an “impostor”. Commonly, verification is used for pos-
itive recognition, which aims to prevent multiple people from using the same
identity.
2.3.2 Identification mode
In the identification mode, the system recognizes an individual by comparing
the user’s biometric input with the templates of all the persons enrolled in the
database, thus conducting a one-to-many comparison to establish an individ-
ual’s identity. The system outputs either the identity of the user having highest
degree of similarity between his templates and the input sample or the decision
that the user presenting the input is not an enrolled user. Identification is used
for negative recognition, which aims to establish whether the person is who
he/she denies to be [36], therefore preventing a single person from using mul-
tiple identities. Figure 2.2 shows the enrollment, and authentication stages of a
biometric system operating in the verification and identification modes.
2.4 Performance Evaluation of a Biometric System
Due to the several factors such as imperfect sensing conditions (e.g., sensor
noise), changes in the user’s biometric characteristic (e.g., face aging), varia-
tions in ambient conditions (e.g., inconsistent illumination levels in iris recog-
nition) and improper interaction with the sensor (e.g., occluded face), the two
extracted feature sets originated from the same biometric trait of an individual
seldom correspond to each other. Thus, the biometric sample matching is never
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Figure 2.2: Enrollment, verification, and identification stages in a biometric system. Here, T
represents the biometric sample obtained during enrollment, Q is the query biometric sample
obtained during recognition, while X I and XQ are the template and query feature sets, respec-
tively. S represents the match score and N is the number of users enrolled in the database.
100% perfect, unlike conventional authentication methods, such as password-
based systems, where a perfect match between two alphanumeric strings is
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mandatory to validate a user’s identity. As a result, the performance of a bio-
metric system is never 100% accurate. The variation evidenced in the biometric
feature set of a user is known as intra-class variation, while it is called inter-
class variation when observed in the feature sets originating from two different
users [38].
A genuine match score is obtained by comparing two samples of the same
biometric trait of a user, whereas the impostor match score is acquired by com-
paring two biometric samples originating from different users [36]. A biometric
verification system can make two types of errors: Type I and Type II. Type I er-
ror, also known as false reject or false non-match, occurs when a genuine match
score falls below the operating threshold (s∗), therefore the genuine user is re-
jected. Type II error, also referred as false accept or false match, occurs when
an impostor match score exceeds the operating threshold (s∗), therefore the im-
postor is wrongly accepted.
The performance of the system, at specified operating threshold value, is
evaluated in terms of the false acceptance rate (FAR) (or, the False Match Rate
(FMR)): the fraction of impostor scores exceeding the threshold, and false re-
jection rate (FRR) (or, the False Non Match Rate (FNMR)): the proportion of
genuine scores falling below the threshold.
Let S, fgenuine(s)= p(S = s|genuine) and fimpostor (s)= p(S = s|impostor )
be the similarity match score, and probability density functions of the genuine
and impostor scores, respectively. The FAR and FRR of the biometric system
are estimated as follows:
FAR(s∗)= p(S ≥ s∗|impostor )=
∫ ∞
s∗
fimpostor (s)ds (2.1)
FRR(s∗)= p(S < s∗|genuine)=
∫ s∗
−∞
fgenuine(s)ds (2.2)
If the operating threshold is increased, FAR will decrease but the FRR will
increase and vice versa. The Genuine Accept Rate (GAR) is the percentage of
genuine scores exceeding the operating threshold (s∗). Therefore,
GAR(s∗)= p(S ≥ s∗|genuine)= 1−FRR(s∗) (2.3)
The overall performance of a biometric system can be summarized by reg-
ulating the different values of threshold and computing the corresponding FAR
and FRR. Plots like Detection Error Tradeoff (DET Curve) [58], where FRR is
plotted as a function of FAR on a normal deviate scale, and Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic (ROC) curve [19], where the GAR is plotted as a function of
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Figure 2.3: DET curves obtained on a face and a fingerprint matcher and using score level
product fusion rule.
FAR on linear, logarithmic or semi-logarithmic scale, are used to represent the
complete performance curve. Equal Error Rate (EER) is the location on a DET
or ROC curve where the FAR equals the FRR. A lower EER value indicates
better performance. Figure 2.3 shows an example of DET Curve.
2.5 Limitations of Unimodal Biometric System
Some of the main factors affecting the accuracy of the unimodal biometric sys-
tems [40] are as follows:
1. Noise in sensed data: Noise in the acquired biometric sample may result
from defective and improperly maintained sensors or unfavorable ambient
conditions. For instance, accumulation of dirt or the residual remains on
a fingerprint sensor may result in a noisy fingerprint image as shown in
Figure 2.4. Noisy biometric sample may not be successfully matched,
for genuine users, with their respective templates in the database or may
be incorrectly matched with the impostors, thus leading to a significant
reduction in the performance of the system [27, 92].
2. Intra-class variations: Intra-class variations in biometric samples are
typically produced by the user’s inappropriate interaction with the sensor
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Figure 2.4: Example of a noisy fingerprint image.
(e.g., incorrect facial pose - see Figure 2.5), changes in the environmental
conditions (e.g., illumination changes), use of different sensors during en-
rollment and verification, or temporal variation in the biometric traits such
as aging [47]. Large intra-class variations usually decrease the genuine
acceptance rate (GAR) of a biometric system.
3. Inter-class similarities: Inter-class similarity is defined as the overlap
of the biometric samples, in the feature space, corresponding to multi-
ple classes or individuals. The lack of uniqueness in the biometric feature
set leads to an increase in the false acceptance rate (FAR) of the system.
Hence, there is an upper bound on the number of unique individuals that
can be accommodated by the biometric system.
4. Non-universality: Universality means that every person using a biomet-
ric system is able to present the respective biometric trait. The biometric
system may not be able to extract meaningful biometric data from a subset
of users. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) has reported that it is not possible to extract correct minutia
features from the fingerprints of two percent of the population (manual
workers with many cuts and bruises on their fingertips, people with hand-
related disabilities etc.), due to the poor quality of the ridges [89]. This
contributes to an increase in the failure to enroll (FTE) rate. Hence, no
biometric trait is truly universal.
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Figure 2.5: Intra-class variation associated with an individual’s face images. Although the
images belong to the same individual, an appearance-based facial recognition system is unlikely
to match these three images successfully, because of change in pose [35].
5. Interoperability issues: Most biometric systems are designed and oper-
ated under the assumption that the biometric sample to be compared are
obtained using the same sensor and, hence, are restricted in their ability to
match or compare biometric samples originating from different sensors.
6. Spoof attacks: Biometric spoof attack is the deliberate attempt to manip-
ulate one’s biometric traits in order to avoid recognition, or the creation
of physical biometric artifacts in order to take on the identity of another
person.
Thereby, unimodal biometric system are not sufficient to meet the variety of
requirements, including matching performance, imposed by several large-scale
authentication systems. The limitations of the unimodal biometric system can
be mitigated by one of the standard solutions known as multimodal biometric
systems.
2.6 Multimodal Biometric Systems
Systems that consolidate the evidences from two or more biometric traits, in
order to more reliably determine the identity of an individual, are known as
multimodal biometric systems [37]. Since, different biometric traits usually
compensate for the inherent limitations of the other traits, therefore multimodal
biometric systems can alleviate many limitations of the traditional unimodal
systems [34]. Multimodal biometric systems offer the following advantages
over unimodal systems:
1. Significant improvement in the overall accuracy can be attained by com-
bining the biometric evidences obtained from different sources using an
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effective fusion technique. The use of multiple biometric sources increases
the dimensionality of the feature space, thus reducing inter-class similari-
ties.
2. The effect of noisy input data causing performance degradation can be
mitigated by the fusion of multiple biometric sources. For instance, in a
face and a fingerprint matcher based system; if the face sample obtained
is not of sufficient quality during a particular acquisition, then fingerprint
samples may still provide sufficient discriminatory information to enable
reliable decision-making.
3. Multimodal biometric systems are also able to address the non-universality
problem and helps to decrease the failure to enroll rate (FTER) and failure
to capture rate (FTCR). For example, if an individual is not able to enroll
in a fingerprint system due to burns or cuts etc., he can still be identified
using other biometric traits like iris etc.
4. Multimodal biometric systems can also proffer “degrees-of-freedom” in
user authentication. Such as, during enrollment face, fingerprint and iris
were captured; later, during authentication any combination of these traits
may be acquired, depending on the nature of the application or the conve-
nience of the user.
Therefore, a properly designed multimodal biometric systems can improve
accuracy and reliability of unimodal systems, with the increase in population
coverage. Extensive empirical evidences have shown that they are effective to
this aim [76, 40, 71, 72, 77, 68].
One of the fundamental issues in designing of a multimodal biometric system
is to determine the type of information that should be fused. The information
fusion can be carried at various levels: sensor level, feature level, score level,
rank level and decision level, as described below. Conventionally, the availabil-
ity of the information content decreases from the sensor level to the decision
level.
1. Sensor level: The raw data acquired from multiple sensors are combined
in sensor level fusion before they are subjected to feature extraction [20].
In this type of fusion, the multiple cues must be compatible; hence usually
fusion of the same biometric trait, obtained either using a single sensor or
different compatible sensors, is carried out. For example, the fingerprint
impressions obtained from optical and solid state sensors can be combined
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to form a single image to be input to the feature extraction and matching
modules.
2. Feature level: Feature level fusion refers to consolidating the evidence
presented by two biometric feature sets of the same individual. The two
feature sets are concatenated to form a single feature set to compare with
the enrollment template in the system database, which itself is a concate-
nated feature set.
3. Score level: In score level fusion, feature sets are extracted independently
by each subsystem, which are later compared with separately stored re-
spective templates. Depending on the proximity of feature set and the
template, each subsystem computes its own match score. The individ-
ual scores are finally fused to produce a single match score for decision-
making process.
4. Rank level: This type of fusion is conducted in identification mode, where
each subsystem associates a rank with each enrolled identity. Thus, the
rank level fusion schemes consolidate the ranks produced by the individual
subsystems in order to derive a consensus rank for each identity in order
to establish the final decision.
5. Decision level: A decision level, also known as abstract level, fusion is
carried out by combining the authentication decision made by individual
biometric matchers. Fusion at the decision level is too rigid, since only
limited information is available at this level.
As mentioned above one of the most fundamental issues in the multimodal
biometric systems is to determine the type of information that should be con-
solidated by the fusion module. Since, the amount of informations goes on
decreasing as one proceeds from sensor level to decision level, therefore mut-
limodal biometric systems that fuse information at at early stages of processing
are expected to yield more promising results than the systems that fuse the in-
formation at later stage. There has been a proliferation of works discussing
different fusion schemes to integrate multiple sources of biometric information
at different levels. Usually, the benefits of fusion technique are exploited when
individual sources of information show complementary nature. Large perfor-
mance disparity between component sources may dilute the performance of the
“stronger” source [14].
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Figure 2.6: A multimodal biometric system made up of a fingerprint and a face sensor, whose
match scores are combined through a fusion rule.
Fusion at the match score level has been extensively studied in the litera-
ture [76, 22, 55, 75, 67, 32, 83, 91, 74, 73, 42] and is also the dominant level
of fusion in multimodal biometric systems, due to ease in accessing and com-
bining the match scores. Therefore, in this thesis we also adopted fusion at
the match score level. Figure 2.6 illustrates the architecture of a multimodal
biometric system, with reference to the one considered in this thesis, namely a
multimodal system composed of a face and a fingerprint matcher. Such systems
operates as follows: At the design phase, genuine users are enrolled into the
system, by storing their biometric traits (templates) in a database together with
the corresponding identities. At authentication phase, the user provides his face
and fingerprint to the respective sensors, and claims his identity. Then, the bio-
metric traits are individually processed and compared with the correspondent
template of the claimed identity, and provides a real-valued match score (de-
noted here as s1 and s2, respectively, for the face and the fingerprint matcher):
higher the score, higher is the similarity. Lastly, the match scores are combined
according to a given fusion rule which outputs a new real-valued score f (s1,s2):
the claimed identity is accepted and the person is classified as a genuine user,
if f (s1,s2) ≥ s∗; otherwise, it is classified as an impostor. The term s∗ is an
acceptance threshold that must be set during design process according to ap-
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Figure 2.7: Typical operational regions of different biometric applications.
plication requirements in terms of false acceptance (FAR) and false rejection
(FRR) rates. Figure 2.7 shows a typical DET curve for a multimodal biometric
system. The highlighted points on the curve show the operational regions for
different application scenarios.
2.7 Summary
Rapid advancements in computer networking, communication, and mobility to-
gether with enhanced concerns about security and identity theft has resulted in
a pronounced need for reliable authentication systems. Conventional identity
management schemes based on passwords or ID cards are limited in their abil-
ity to meet the security requirements. Some of the limitations of conventional
authentication methods can be addressed by biometrics, that uses the physical
and behavioral characteristics of a person, such as fingerprint, face, iris etc.,
to establish the identity. As a result, biometric systems are being deployed in
various applications including travel and transportation, financial institutions,
health care, law enforcement agencies and border crossing, thus enhancing se-
curity and reducing identify fraud. Unimodal biometric systems (system using
only one biometric trait) suffer from several factors such as noisy data, large
intra-class variations, and improper user interaction etc. Some of the limitations
of unimodal biometric systems can be mitigated by multimodal biometric sys-
tems (systems using more than one biometric trait). A systematically designed
multimodal biometric system can increase matching accuracy and population
coverage in comparison to the unimodal system. In multimodal systems, the ev-
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idence presented by multiple biometric sources can be consolidated at various
levels: sensor level, feature level, score level, rank level and decision level. Fu-
sion at the score level has received the maximum attention from the biometrics
research community, due to ease in accessing and combing the match scores.
Score fusion in a multimodal biometric verification system can be formulated
as a two-class classification problem: genuine and impostor classes. Also, in
this thesis, score level fusion based multimodal biometric system, made up of a
face and a fingerprint matcher, has been adopted to study the issues of robust-
ness against spoof attacks.
Chapter 3
Security of Biometric Systems
3.1 Introduction
In spite of many advantages, biometric systems like any other security applica-
tions are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. An attack on a biometric system
can take place for three main reasons:
1. A person may wish to disguise his own identity. For instance, An individ-
ual/terrorist attempting to enter a country without legal permission may
try to modify his biometric trait or conceal it by placing an artificial bio-
metric trait (e.g. a synthetic fingerprint, mask, or contact lens) over his
biometric trait. Recently, in January 2009, the Japanese border control fin-
gerprint system was deceived by a woman who used tape-made artificial
fingerprints on her true fingerprints [90].
2. An attack on a biometric system can occur because an individual wants
to attain privileges that another person has. The impostor, in this case,
may forge biometric trait of genuine user in order to gain the unauthorized
access to systems such as person’s bank account or to gain physical access
to a restricted region.
3. A benefit to sharing biometric trait may be the cause to attack the biomet-
ric systems. Someone, for instance, can establish a new identity during
enrollment using a synthetically generated biometric trait. Thus, sharing
the artificial biometric trait leads to sharing that fraudulent identity with
multiple people.
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Figure 3.1: Points of attack in a generic biometric system.
3.2 Attacks against Biometric Systems
Adversary attacks exploit the system vulnerabilities generally at one or more
modules or interfaces. Eight possible different points where security of biomet-
ric systems can be compromised have been identified in [70], (see Figure 3.1),
as described below:
1. A fake biometric trait may be presented at the sensor such as a fake finger,
a copy of a signature, or a face mask.
2. Digitally stored biometric data may be resubmitted to the system. In this
kind of attack, a previously recorded biometric data is replayed into the
system bypassing the sensor, thus also called as “replay attack". For in-
stance, presenting a digital copy of fingerprint image or recorded audio
signal of a speaker.
3. The feature extractor may be attacked with a Trojan horse program that
produces predetermined feature sets.
4. Legitimate feature sets extracted from the biometric input may be replaced
with synthetic feature sets. For example, if minutiae of a fingerprint are
transmitted to a remote matcher (say over the Internet) than this threat is
very real.
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5. The matcher may be attacked with a Trojan horse program that always
directly produce a specified result - match, no match, or a score.
6. The enrolled templates in the database may be modified or removed, or
new templates may be introduced in the database, which could result in
authorization for a fraudulent individual, or at least denial of service for
the person associated with the corrupted template.
7. The enrolled templates in the stored database are sent to the matcher through
a communication channel which could be attacked to change the contents
of the templates before they reach the matcher.
8. The final decision output by the biometric system may be overridden with
the choice of result from the hacker. Even if the feature extraction and
matching modules had an excellent performance characteristics, it has
been rendered useless by the simple exercise of overriding the result.
3.3 Spoof Attacks
Among the potential attacks discussed in the literature, the one with the great-
est practical relevance is “spoof attack”, which consists in submitting a stolen,
copied or synthetically replicated biometric trait to the sensor to defeat the bio-
metric system security in order to gain unauthorized access. Recently, it has
been shown that spoof attacks can be carried against many types of biometrics,
like fingerprint, face, and iris [28, 59, 10, 82, 79, 33]. This kind of attack is also
known as “direct attack”, since it is carried out directly on the biometric sen-
sor. The feasibility of a spoof attack is much higher than other types of attacks
against biometric systems, as it does not require any knowledge on the system,
such as the feature extraction or matching algorithm used. Digital protection
techniques like hashing, encryption, and digital signature, are not useful due to
the nature of spoofing attacks, which are done in the analogical domain, outside
the digital limits of the system.
“Liveness” testing (vitality detection) methods have been suggested among
feasible counteractions against spoof attacks by several researchers. Liveness
testing, which aims to detect whether the submitted biometric trait is live or ar-
tificial1, is performed by either software module based on signal processing or
hardware module embedded into the input device itself [6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 43,
1In this thesis, we will use both “fake” and “spoofed” terms interchangeably, to indicate an artificial replica of
genuine client’s biometric trait.
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Figure 3.2: Spoofed fingers: Silicone (left) and Gelatin (right).
45, 51, 52, 94]. But, the literature review states that so far no effective method
exists. Moreover, the collateral effect when biometric systems are coupled with
liveness detection methods is the increase of false rejection rate (FRR): the per-
centage of genuine users rejected by the system. Other spoof detection algo-
rithms have been proposed for other biometric traits, but their performances are
not satisfactory as well.
3.3.1 Fingerprint spoofing
It is worth noting that the idea of fooling fingerprint recognition systems using
a replicated fake fingertip is not a novelty. For the very first time, the idea
of fingerprint spoofing was described by the mystery writer R. A. Freeman in
his book “The Red Thumb Mark” [23], published in 1907. James Bond, more
recently, was able to spoof a fingerprint recognition system with a thin layer of
latex glued on his fingertip, in the film “Diamonds are Forever” (1971) [30].
Real-life fingerprint spoofing is also quite an old exercise. Alert Wehde car-
ried out the very first endeavor to spoof fingerprints in the 1920s [11]. He,
then an inmate at a Kansas penitentiary, used his expertise in photography and
engraving to produce a gummy fingerprint from a latent fingerprint. The la-
tent fingerprint was highlighted using forensic methods, and a photograph was
taken. The photograph was then used to etch the print onto a copper plate,
which was later used to generate fake latent fingerprints on surfaces.
In recent years, several research studies have been conducted to investigate
how spoofed fingerprints can circumvent state-of-the-art fingerprint recogni-
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Figure 3.3: Spoofed fingerprint reproduction without cooperation.
tion systems. Authors in [69] studied the susceptibility of different biometric
fingerprint sensors to fake fingerprints synthesized with silicone and plasticine.
Results on six optical and solid-state commercial sensors were reported. Five
sensors permitted the unauthorized access into the system on the first attempt,
while the remaining one was spoofed on the second attempt.
Matsumoto et al. [59] reported, by conducting similar experiments as in [69],
that fake fingerprints fabricated with gelatin are more effective. The authors
tested eleven commercial fingerprint sensors, with a success rate higher than
60%, even also when the fake fingerprints were replicated from the latent fin-
gerprint. A similar evaluation of robustness of different sensors to fake fin-
gerprints fabricated with several spoofing techniques can be found in [84, 43].
In [43], the authors extended the experiments reported in [59] to test new sen-
sors embedded with fake detection measures. The authors concluded that such
fake detection measures were able to reject spoofed fingerprints replicated us-
ing non-conductive materials such as silicone, while were not able to detect fake
fingerprints fabricated using conductive materials like gelatin (see Figure 3.2).
Similarly, in [25] systems with different well-known sensors (including de-
vices produced by Biometrika, Digital Persona, Fujitsu, Identix, Siemens or
Precise Biometrics) were tested by gummy fingers replicated by several spoof-
ing materials and techniques.
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Figure 3.4: Two examples of spoofed fingerprint reproduction with cooperation.
Recently, in [24] the possibility of fabricating fake fingerprints from stan-
dard minutiae templates was studied. A two-stage process was carried out to
create the spoofed fingerprints. In the first stage, fingerprint images were re-
constructed from the genuine user’s minutiae template. This stage was termed
as “from the template to the image”. In the second stage, called “from the image
to the gummy fingerprint”, the reconstructed images were utilized to produce
fake fingerprints. In spite of some errors that were accumulated during the re-
construction process, more than 70% of the fake fingerprints were accepted by
the system.
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The existing literature, as described above, suggests that fingerprint spoofing
methods can be classified into two broad categories: “consensual/cooperative/direct
casts” and “non-consensual/non-cooperative/indirect casts”. In the consensual
method, the fake fingerprints are created with the consent and collaboration of
the fingerprint owner. In the non-consensual method the cooperation of the
user is not required, since the latent finger-marks, that the user has unnotice-
ably left on some surface, are used to fabricate the spoofed fingerprint using a
very similar procedure to that mentioned in [11]: today, printed circuit board
etching is a successful molding technique for producing “gummy” and other
soft material artificial fingers [80] (see Figure 3.3). It is worth noting that most
of the research studies have been conducted using spoofed fingerprints fabri-
cated with the consensual method. Also, the consensual method was adopted to
create high quality fake fingerprints in the First and Second Editions of the In-
ternational Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet09, LivDet11)
[52, 94]. The method consists of the following steps (see Figure 3.4):
1. The user presses his finger on a soft material such as wax, play doh, dental
impression material, or plaster;
2. The negative impression of the fingerprint is fixed on the surface to form a
mold;
3. A casting material such as liquid silicon, wax, gelatin, moldable plastic,
plaster or clay, is poured in the mould;
4. When the liquid is hardened, the fake/spooed fingerprint is formed.
3.3.2 Face spoofing
In spite of the fair amount of advancement in biometric face recognition sys-
tems, face spoofing, also known as “copy attack”, still poses a serious threat to
the system security. Face spoofing methods may vary according to the targeted
face recognition system. Face recognition systems can be broadly classified
into two groups: 2D (two-dimensional) and 3D (three-dimensional) systems.
A biometric 2D face recognition system takes into consideration only the two
dimensional image of the face. 3D systems are clearly more complex, and rec-
ognize faces on the basis of features extracted from the 3D shape of the whole
face, using methods such as paraxial viewing, or patterned illumination light
[29]. Conventionally, face recognition systems can be spoofed by presenting (i)
a photograph, (ii) a video, or (iii) a 3D face model/mask of a legitimate user.
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Figure 3.5: An example of face spoofing using “photo-attack” method.
Face spoof attack through photograph or video is the most common, cheapest
and easiest method to circumvent face recognition systems [10, 95]. Spoof
attacks through photograph, known as “photo-attacks”, consist in submitting
a photograph of a legitimate user to the face recognition system, displayed in
hard copy or on the screen of a portable computer or smart phone [10, 95]
(see Figure 3.5). Since face is not concealed like other biometric traits, it may
be easier to spoof; for instance, a genuine user’s facial image can be simply
captured using distant cameras, without their awareness and prior consent for
spoofing purpose. Moreover, due to social image sharing and social networking
websites, personal facial photographs of many users are usually accessible to
the public. For instance, an impostor can obtain the photographs of genuine
users from a social network, and submit them to a biometric authentication
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Figure 3.6: Some of spoofed face examples. Materials from left column to right are: photo,
video replay, rubber and silica gel (adapted from [95]).
system to fool it. It is worth noting that the “photo-attack” method was used
to assess the performance of face liveness detection systems at the competition
on counter measures to 2D facial spoofing attacks, held in conjunction with the
2012 International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB 2012) [10].
The advent of public video sharing websites and reduction in the cost of high
quality tiny video cameras and portable devices have also made it easy to obtain
or capture a genuine user’s facial video samples without subject’s consent and
awareness, which can later be presented to the system using a portable device
for spoofing purpose [95, 10, 45]. The likelihood of success of a video attack
becomes higher due to the physiological clues in the displayed spoofed faces
(e.g., facial expression, eye blinking, and head movement), which could also
thwart liveness detection techniques based on these clues.
3D face recognition systems can be spoofed by 3D face model or face mask
fabricated by rubber, plastic, silica gel [95] (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7). The
prerequisite to spoof 3D face systems is the presented face to camera should
be three dimensional, thus making 3D face spoofing more complicated than a
2D face spoofing. Due to ease in spoof fabrication, and to the wide adoption of
2D systems across the globe, “photo attacks” and “video attacks” are still the
most common techniques to spoof faces.
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Figure 3.7: Examples of spoofed 3D faces (adapted from [21]).
3.4 Robustness of Multimodal Biometric Systems against
Spoof Attacks
Besides ad hoc countermeasures, multimodal biometric systems are also consid-
ered as a natural defence mechanism against spoof attacks. Multimodal systems
have been originally proposed to overcome the weaknesses and some inherent
limitations of unimodal systems, in order to improve the identity recognition
performance. Their effectiveness has been shown by extensive theoretical and
empirical evidences [56, 61, 62]. In addition, they proved to be quite robust un-
der stress conditions, namely, poor cooperation of the user (e.g., wearing glasses
or beard) [55]. It is also commonly believed that multimodal systems are intrin-
sically more robust to spoof attacks than systems using a single biometric trait
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[78, 34]. The belief on their intrinsic robustness against spoof attacks is based
on the assumption that an intruder has to spoof all fused biometrics simultane-
ously to crack the multimodal system [78, 34]. Such an attack would require
more effort than spoofing a single trait, and this could be a valid deterrent for
discouraging the adversary from attempting the attack.
However, this assumption is not based on any theoretical findings or em-
pirical evidences, but only on intuitive and qualitative arguments, which rely
mainly on the higher performance of multi-modal systems with respect to uni-
modal ones. However, some recent works, contrary to the common belief, have
provided experimental evidence that spoofing only one biometric trait can be
sufficient to evade the system, even when more than two biometric traits are
used [74, 73, 42]. They considered systems made up of two (face and finger-
print) [74, 73] or three matchers (face, fingerprint and iris) [42]. A substantial
increase of the false acceptance rate (FAR) of these systems under spoof attacks
was indeed highlighted. Most of the results however reported in [74, 73, 42]
were obtained under the unrealistic and stringent hypothesis (known as “worst-
case” scenario) that the attacker is able to fabricate a perfect replica of the gen-
uine user’s biometric trait whose matching score distribution is identical to the
one of genuine traits; which was simulated by assuming that the matching score
distribution of fake traits is identical to the one of genuine users. In [74], the
authors have proposed two new score fusion rules to improve robustness against
spoof attacks. Such rules (a fuzzy rule and a modification of the LLR rule) are
based on a quality measure aimed at discriminating among fake and live traits,
and (in the case of the modified LLR rule) to take into account the possibility of
spoof attack at design phase, by simulating the presence of spoofed trait scores
among training data set using “worst-case” assumption. While, this “worst-
case” assumption may be reasonable for some biometric traits, like 2D faces (as
discussed in [73]), its validity for other biometric traits like iris and fingerprint
is questionable.
It is worth noting that in [73] some experiments have been carried out us-
ing a fraction of real spoofed fingerprints from the Fingerprint Liveness De-
tection Competition (LivDet09) [52]. The fake fingerprint score distribution
obtained in the study was significantly different from the genuine score distri-
bution, therefore additionally providing the proof that worst-case hypothesis is
not realistic for all biometric traits and spoofing techniques.
Thus, the results in [74, 73, 42] raise the issue of investigating more thor-
oughly and systematically the robustness of multimodal systems against real
spoof attacks, namely under non-worst case scenarios (when the fake traits are
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not exact replicas of genuine ones), and devising new methods to design robust
multimodal biometric systems against them.
3.5 Open Issues in Robustness of Multimodal Biomet-
ric Systems against Spoof attacks
Although, multimodal biometric systems offer several advantages such as better
recognition accuracy, increased population coverage and greater flexibility, the
problem of evaluating the performance of a multimodal biometric system, in
terms of both generalisation capability and robustness against spoof attack, is
an open research problem. Major open problems that are still unresolved to
ensuring a secure multimodal biometric recognition system include:
(a) Can multimodal biometric systems be actually cracked by attacking only
one sensor via real attacks?
Though, the robustness of multimodal biometric systems has been ques-
tioned recently in [74, 73, 42] by showing that, in some application scenar-
ios, they can be cracked by spoofing only one of the biometric traits. How-
ever, the scope of those results are very limited, since they were obtained
by simulating the scores of spoofed traits under the unrealistic hypothesis
known as “worst-case” scenario, where it is assumed that the attacker is able
to fabricate a perfect replica of a biometric trait whose matching score dis-
tribution is identical to the one of genuine traits. Nevertheless, if the results
in [74, 73, 42] turned out to be held in more realistic application scenarios,
this would imply that multimodal systems are just a deterrent rather than
a real defense against spoof attacks. On the other hand, a more wide and
realistic evaluation could point out the conditions under which multimodal
biometric systems are a good defence countermeasure. In other words, it
is still crucial to investigate whether the conclusion drawn from the results
in [74, 73, 42], that the multimodal biometric systems are not intrinsically
more robust against spoof attacks, also holds in realistic scenarios.
(b) Is the “worst-case” scenario hypothesized in [74, 73, 42] for spoofing bio-
metrics representative of real spoof attacks?
Recent works [74, 73, 42] have shown that multimodal biometric systems
can be highly vulnerable to spoof attacks, under a very restrictive “worst-
case” working hypothesis. However, the “worst-case” hypothesis for spoof
attacks may not be generalized for all biometric traits, as also pointed out in
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[73]. It is thus interesting to further investigate whether and to what extent
the “worst-case” scenario hypothesized in [74, 73, 42] is realistic, which is
still itself an open issue. A more systematic and large-scale experimental
analysis are indeed required. Such analysis will allow us to point out to
what extent the drop in performance under the “worst-case” attack scenario
is representative of the performance under real spoof attacks.
(c) How can the security of multimodal systems be evaluated, under realistic
attacks, without fabricating spoofed traits?
A straightforward approach to evaluate the security of a multimodal biomet-
ric system against realistic spoof attacks is to fabricate fake biometric traits
and submit them to the system to check its vulnerability. However, fabricat-
ing fake biometric traits is a time-consuming and cumbersome task, thus im-
practical for the system designer [52]. A potential alternative is to develop
methods based on simulating the spoofed biometric traits. The state-of-the-
art [74, 73, 42] solves this problem by simulating the effect of spoof attacks
in terms of modelling the score distribution of the corresponding biometric
trait. In particular, the fake score distribution is assumed to be coincident
to the genuine users one, thus drawing a “worst-case” scenario. Therefore,
an interesting open issue is the development of realistic models which are
efficient in simulating the score distribution of the real spoof attacks. This
is possible by considering different degrees of the quality of the fake traits,
which in real scenarios can be due to different forgery skills of the attack-
ers, thus overcoming the intrinsic limits of the “worst-case” assumption.
The two-fold aim of the development should be (a) assessing the robust-
ness of multimodal systems, and (b) to design novel fusion rules, robust to
spoof attacks. In particular, it is crucial to develop evaluation methodolo-
gies that can be applied to any multimodal system, namely, to any set of
matchers combined with any fusion rule, and allowing to simulate a spoof
attack against any subset of the component matchers. Moreover, it can also
be useful to compare the robustness of different score fusion rules applied
to a given multimodal system. However, till date no systematic research
effort has been carried out towards this direction.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we first discussed the rationale behind the attacks on bio-
metric authentication systems. We further mentioned the eight points of
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vulnerabilities that an adversary may exploit to mislead a biometric recog-
nition system. Among all the attacks, spoof attacks i.e. presenting fake bio-
metric traits to the sensor are gaining much attention and we accordingly
defined and discussed them at length. In fact, the comprehensive review
of the state-of-the-art spoofing methods for face and fingerprint biometrics
is presented. Then, in Section 3.4, the literature review on the evaluation
of the robustness of multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks is
provided. Various existing studies concluded, contrary to a common belief,
that multimodal biometric systems are vulnerable to spoof attacks, and can
be cracked even by spoofing only one trait. We then listed representative
open issues identified from the existing literature related to direct attacks
for multimodal systems.
To conclude, we can say that the state-of-the-art presented in this chapter
clearly highlights the need for a more systematic security analysis of multi-
modal systems against real spoof attacks. Indeed, in the following chapters
of this thesis we further focused and explored above mentioned open is-
sues to advance the state-of-the-art, namely, evaluating the performance of
multimodal systems against real spoof spoof attacks, checking the validity
of “worst-case” scenario hypothesized in the literature of biometric spoof
attacks and the designing of methods to analyze the security/robustness of
multimodal systems against real spoof attacks without fabricating spoofed
traits.
Chapter 4
Real Spoof Attacks against
Multimodal Biometric Systems
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the problem of evaluating the robustness of multi-
modal biometric systems against real spoof attacks. We argue that existing stud-
ies [74, 73, 42] in the literature to assess the security of multimodal biometric
systems against spoof attacks do not provide a complete and exhaustive view of
the performance degradation of a multimodal system under real spoof attacks,
since they only focus on assessing the performance using simulated spoof at-
tacks in “wost-case” scenario, and mainly disregard the issue of robustness of
the multimodal biometric systems against real spoof attacks.
The need for evaluating the robustness of multimodal biometric systems un-
der real spoof attacks was also highlighted in Chapter 3, where we reviewed
several works which assessed the robustness of multimodal biometric systems
under “wost-case” scenario based spoof attacks.
As discussed in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 that, until a few years ago, multi-
modal biometric systems were commonly believed to be not only more accu-
rate but also intrinsically more robust to spoof attacks than unimodal systems
[78, 34]. The belief on their intrinsic robustness against spoof attacks was based
on the assumption that an attacker has to spoof all fused biometric traits simulta-
neously to crack the system. However, recently this belief has been questioned
and shown empirically that spoofing only one biometric trait can be adequate to
crack the multimodal biometric systems [74, 73, 42]. But, most of the results
were attained under the “worst-case” scenario, which was obtained by simulat-
ing the fake biometric trait’s scores under the hypothesis that their distribution is
39
40 CHAPTER 4. REAL SPOOF ATTACKS AGAINST MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
identical to the genuine user’s one, namely, that the attacker is able to fabricate
a perfect replica of the attacked genuine biometric trait. However, a scenario
in which the attacker can always replicate the exact replica of genuine user’s
biometric traits may not be realistic. For instance, a scenario in which the at-
tackers always capturing the exact face of genuine clients as the ones used into
the system as templates may not be feasible. Thus, it is difficult to general-
ize the findings in [74, 73, 42]: a more systematic and large-scale empirical
investigation is indeed required.
In other words, it is still necessary to test the robustness of multimodal bio-
metric systems under various scenarios of real spoof attacks, namely under
“non-worst” case scenarios. Such analysis would allow to check the validity
of results in [74, 73, 42], that is to investigate experimentally the open issues
(a) and (b) pointed out in Section 3.5 of previous chapter 3, viz., “Can multi-
modal biometric systems be actually cracked by attacking only one sensor via
real attacks?” and “Is the “worst-case” scenario hypothesized in [74, 73, 42]
for spoofing biometrics representative of real spoof attacks?”
To address these open issues, in this chapter we analyze the robustness of
multimodal biometric systems, made up of a face and a fingerprint matcher,
against real spoof attacks by carrying out a substantial set of experiments with
large data sets containing real spoof attacks. We created and collected, both
for fingerprints and faces, several data sets consisting of real spoof attacks. In
order to get a very large set of fake fingerprints, we fabricated the spoofed fin-
gerprints using four materials with state-of-the-art methods. It is worth noting
that these fake fingerprints were also used in the First and Second Fingerprint
Liveness Detection Competition [52, 94]. We also built three different face data
sets corresponding to different attack scenarios depending on how the attacker
fabricates the fake faces. One of them is public data set recently used in the
Competition on Countermeasures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks [10]. We con-
ducted many experiments on a large number of score fusion rules, including the
one proposed in [74], which is explicitly designed to be robust to spoof attacks.
In addition, we also simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks, based on the same
hypothesis in [74, 73, 42], in order to compare the corresponding results with
those attained by real spoof attacks.
Below, we first describe the data sets in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 summarizes
well-known and widely used fusion rules, which are adopted in this study, with
experimental protocol. While Section 4.4 discusses the achieved experimental
results with concluding remarks.
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Figure 4.1: Original template image of a fingerprint of our data set (Left). A spoof of the same
fingerprint obtained by using latex (middle), and silicon (right).
4.2 Data Sets
The size and the characteristics of the data sets described in the following sec-
tions are reported in Table 4.1.
4.2.1 Fingerprint
The fingerprint data set used in this study is composed of of 142 distinct users1.
For each “live” finger and its corresponding fake replica, twenty different im-
pressions were acquired in two different sessions, separated by about two weeks
interval. Only four fingers were considered in this case: the left and right index
and thumb fingers. To create the fake fingerprints, we adopted the “consen-
sual” method described in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1. We used a plasticine-like
material as the mold, while the spoofs were created with four basic materials:
silicon, latex, gelatin and alginate as the casts. These four materials are com-
monly adopted for replicating fingerprints, and have been used for assessing the
performance of fingerprint liveness detection systems at First and Second Inter-
national Competition on Fingerprint Liveness Detection (LivDet) [52, 94]. The
fingerprint images were acquired using the well-known Biometrika FX2000 op-
tical sensor, which has a resolution of 569 dpi, and a sensing area of 13.2 mm.
Some sample images, showing the average quality of provided spoofs, from
our data sets are shown in Figure 4.1. This figure shows the original, “live”
client image, beside a replica made up of latex, and a replica made up of sili-
cone. As it can be seen, the latex image is very similar to the original one, whilst
the second one is characterized by some artifacts. The fake fingerprints used in
1By “users”, here, we mean a distinct finger, even if it belongs to the same person
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Figure 4.2: Left: original template image of one of the users of our live face data set. Middle:
spoofed face of the Photo Attack data set, obtained by a “photo-attack” method. Right: spoofed
face of the Personal Photo Attack data set, obtained by a personal photo voluntarily provided
by the same user.
this study represent the state-of-the-art in fingerprint spoofing, thus providing a
reasonable set of realistic scenarios.
4.2.2 Face
We collected and built three face data sets. The first two data sets include the
same users but two different kinds of face spoof attacks: the Photo Attack and
the Personal Photo Attack data sets. The “live” face images of each user were
collected into two sessions, with a time interval of about two weeks between
them, under different lighting conditions and facial expressions.
We then created the spoofed face images for the Photo Attack data set using
the “photo attack” method described in [10, 95, 51, 45]. It consists in displaying
a photo of the targeted user on a laptop screen, which is then put in front of the
camera. In particular, the testing “live” face images of the clients were used to
this end. This simulates a scenario in which the attacker can obtain photos of
the targeted user under a setting similar to the one of the verification phase.
To build the Personal Photo Attack data set of spoofed faces, we used a set
of personal photos voluntarily provided by 25 of the 50 users in our data set. On
average, we were able to collect 5 photos per client. These photos were taken
in different times and under different environmental conditions than those of
the live templates. This simulates a scenario where the attacker may be able to
collect a photo of the targeted client from the Web; for instance, from a social
network or from an image search engine.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the original template image of one of the
users, a spoof obtained by the photo attack, and a spoof obtained from an image
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Data set Number Number Number
of users of spoofs of live
per user per user
Silicon 142 20 20
Latex 80 3 5
Gelatin 80 3 5
Alginate 80 3 5
Photo Attack 40 60 60
Personal Photo Attack 25 3 (avg.) 60
Print Attack 50 12 16
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the fake fingerprint and fake face data sets used in the experiments.
voluntarily provided by the same user. These two spoofs reflect two different
degrees of expected effectiveness, but also of realism. In fact, a photo attack
based on one of the images in the data set appears to have, by visual inspection,
more chances to be successful than a spoof obtained by personal photos, as the
latter are often significantly different from the template images of a biometric
system. On the other hand, the latter case may be more realistic, as it would
be probably easier for an attacker to obtain a photo of the targeted client from
the Web, than an image similar to his template. According to the above obser-
vations, we expect that the fake score distribution of our Photo Attack data set
(provided by some matching algorithm) will be very similar to that of the gen-
uine users (as verified in Section 4.4.2), whilst the effectiveness of a spoof attack
based on personal photos will strongly depend on the ability of the attacker to
obtain images similar to the templates used by the system.
The third face data set, we used is Print Attack database [10, 6]. After the
Competition on Countermeasures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks, held in con-
junction with the International Joint Conference on Biometrics, in 2011, the
Print Attack database was made publicly available. It consists of 200 video
clips of printed-photo attack attempts to 50 clients, under different lighting con-
ditions, and of 200 real-access attempts from the same clients. As we need to
operate on images, we extracted the “live” and spoofed face images from the
corresponding videos. In particular, for each client, we extracted 12 “live” face
images and 16 spoofed face images from each video clip, as summarized in
Table 4.1.
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4.3 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe our experimental setup, including the multimodal
data sets and score fusion rules used.
In this study, we used a multimodal biometric system based on face and
fingerprint, like the one of Figure 2.6, with different score fusion rules.
4.3.1 Fusion rules
Score fusion rules can be subdivided into fixed and trained. The difference
between them is that the latter include a set of parameters to be estimated from
training data. We describe here the most widely used rules, which will also be
used in the experiments of Section 4.4. In the following, s1 and s2 denote scores
provided respectively by face and fingerprint matchers, and s = f (s1, s2) is the
score fusion rule.
Fixed rules
Sum. The fused score is obtained by simple addition of the individual score
values:
f (s1, s2)= s1+ s2 . (4.1)
Product. The product rule computes the fused score as:
f (s1, s2)= s1× s2 . (4.2)
Trained rules
Weighted sum by Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). The individual scores
are linearly combined as:
f (s1, s2)=w0+w1s1+w2s2 . (4.3)
The weights w0, w1 and w2 are set as the ones that maximize the Fisher distance
(FD) between the score distributions of genuine and impostor users. In the case
of two matchers, FD is defined as follows:
FD = (µI−µG)
2
σ2I +σ2G
, (4.4)
where µI and µG are the means respectively of the impostor and genuine score
distributions, while σ2I and σ
2
G are their variances.
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Likelihood ratio (LLR). This is a trained rule which corresponds to the
so-called Neyman-Pearson test:
f (s1, s2)= p(s1, s2|G)
p(s1, s2|I)
. (4.5)
Conditional independence between s1 and s2, given that they come either from
an impostor or a genuine user, is often assumed such that p(s1, s2|·)= p(s1|·)p(s2|·),
where p(·|G) and p(·|I) are the matching scores probability density function
(PDF) of genuine and impostor users, respectively. In general, parametric (e.g.,
Gaussian, Gamma, Beta) or non-parametric models (e.g., Parzen windows) can
be used to fit the genuine and impostor distributions. Note that, in this case,
f (s1, s2) is not obtained as a matching score between two biometric traits, but
as a ratio between likelihoods. Nevertheless, the decision rule is the same as
above.
Extended LLR (ExtLLR). This is a variation of the LLR, which was pro-
posed in [74] to make it robust against spoof attacks. The basic idea was to
explicitly take into account the probability distribution of spoof attacks when
modeling the probability distribution of the impostor class. To this end, the fol-
lowing model was proposed in [74]2. Let the random variable U ∈ {G,I} denote
whether a user is a genuine or an impostor. Given a multimodal system made up
of M matchers, their scores are assumed to be conditionally independent, given
U : p(s1, s2, . . . , sM |U )= p(s1|U )p(s2|U ) · · ·p(sM |U ). M binary random variables
Ti are then introduced, to denote whether a user is attempting a spoof attack
against the i -th matcher (Ti = 1), or not (Ti = 0). Genuine users are assumed to
always submit a real biometric trait, namely: P (T1 = 0, . . . ,TM = 0|U = G) = 1.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each of the 2M −1 possible combinations of at-
tacks against one or more matchers are equiprobable. Denoting with α the prior
probability of a spoofing attack, this implies:
P (T1, . . . ,TM |U = I)=
{
1−α if Ti = 0, i = 1, . . . ,M ,
α
2M−1 otherwise.
(4.6)
Finally, M binary random variables Fi are further introduced, to denote whether
a spoof attack carried out by an impostor against the i -th matcher (i.e., when
U = I and Ti = 1) is “successful” (Fi = 1) or not (Fi = 0), in the sense defined
below. Clearly, Fi = 0 when the i -th matcher is not under attack, which implies
2The availability of a quality score for each matcher was considered in [74], together with the matching score.
In the description of the ExtLLR rule we omit the quality score, since it was not used in our experiments, and also
because we mainly intend to evaluate the contribution of the Extended LLR rule to the robustness of the LLR rule,
due only on its capability to model the presence of spoofed samples.
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P (Fi = 0|Ti = 0) = 1. The probability of success P (Fi = 1|Ti = 1) is denoted
with ci . Its value was related to the “security” ot the corresponding matcher. In
[74] it is pointed out that evaluating the security of a matcher is a very difficult
problem, if not impossible to solve, and thus ci must be evaluated based on
general knowledge about the biometrics at hand. In the experiments of [74],
such value was manually set (see below).
It is now possible to derive the conditional distribution of scores that is
needed by the standard LLR rule (see Eq. 5.4), by marginalising over the 2M
random variables Ti and Fi :
p(s1, . . . , sM |U ) =∑T1,...,TM∑F1,...,FM p(s1, . . . , sM ,T1, . . . ,TM ,F1, . . . ,FM |U )
=∑T1,...,TM∑F1,...,FM P (T1, . . . ,TM |U )×∏Mi=1 [P (Fi |Ti )P (si |Fi ,U )] .
(4.7)
To evaluate the above probability, it is necessary to know the M distributions
P (si |Fi ,U ). Given the above assumptions, for genuine users (U = G) we have
Fi = 0, and thus P (si |Fi = 0,U = G) can be learnt from genuine training sam-
ples, as in the standard LLR rule. For impostor users (U = I) two assumptions
are made in [74]. First, in the case of unsuccessful attacks, the conditional score
distribution P (si |Fi = 0,U = I) is identical to the one of impostors users that do
not attempt spoof attacks, also called “zero-effort” impostors in [42]. Therefore,
this distribution can be learnt from traning data as well. Second, the score dis-
tribution of successful spoofing attacks is identical to the one of genuine scores:
P (si |Fi = 1,U = I) = P (si |Fi = 0,U = G). The latter assumption corresponds to
the “worst-case” scenario mentioned above.
It immediately follows that, for a bimodal system (M = 2) as the one con-
sidered in [74] and in this work, the expression of the joint likelihood in (4.7)
is:
p(s1, s2|I ) = α
3
(1− c1)(1+ c2)p(s1|G)p(s2|I ) (4.8)
+ α
3
(1+ c1)(1− c2)p(s1|I )p(s2|G) (4.9)
+ α
3
(1− c1)(1− c2)p(s1|G)p(s2|G) (4.10)
+ α
3
(c1+ c2+ c1c2)p(s1|I )p(s2|I ) (4.11)
+ (1−α)p(s1|I )p(s2|I ) , (4.12)
where the terms (4.8) and (4.9) are related to successful spoofing attempts
against one trait (respectively, 1 and 2), (4.10) corresponds to a successful spoof
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attempt against both of them, (4.11) accounts for unsuccessful spoof attempts
against both traits, and (4.12) corresponds to “standard” impostor attempts with-
out spoof attacks, namely “zero-effort” impostors [42].
LLR and ExtLLR require the estimation of individual likelihood. To this
aim, we fit the available genuine and impostor match scores with a parametric
distribution [74, 73, 42]. A Gamma distribution was used, as done in [74], be-
cause it turned out to provide a good approximation of our data. Moreover, the
parameters, α, c1 and c2 were set to the same values used in [74], respectively
0.01, 0.3, and 0.7. Note that in a real application the values of these parameters,
namely the probability of a spoofing attempt, and the probability that a spoofing
attempt against each of the considered biometric does not succeed, can not be
estimated from training data, and can only be hypothesized.
4.3.2 Experimental protocol
We used similar experimental protocol as in [74, 42], described in the following:
• Since no multimodal data sets including spoof attacks are available pub-
licly. Hence, to built multimodal data sets (i.e., data sets in which each user
has a face and a fingerprint trait), we randomly associated face and finger-
print images of pairs of users of the available face (Photo Attack, Personal
Photo Attack and Print Attack) and fingerprint (silicon, latex, gelatin and
alginate spoofs) data sets, thus obtaining twelve “chimerical” data set. We
carried out this procedure because the face and fingerprint data sets did not
contain the same users. Note that building chimerical data sets is a widely
used approach in experimental investigations on multimodal biometrics
[66, 78, 26, 16].
• To carry out more runs of the experiments, each of the twelve chimerical
data set was randomly subdivided into five pairs of training and testing
sets. For each training set we used 40% of the “virtual” users,3 while
the remaining 60% were used to build the testing set. Furthermore, all the
above procedure was repeated five times, for different random associations
of face and fingerprint images of pairs of users (namely, creating different
“virtual” users). In each run, the parameters of the trained fusion rules
have been estimated on the training set. The presented results are average
testing set performance over the resulting twenty-five runs.
3The clients of a chimerical data set are usually referred to as “virtual” users [26, 16], since they do not
correspond to a real person or identity.
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• The fake matching scores were computed by comparing each fake image
of a given user with the corresponding template image.
• The performance was assessed by computing DET curves (FAR vs. FRR).
Note that, in the evaluation of spoof attacks, the FAR corresponds to the
percentage of spoof attempts that were accepted as genuine. To avoid con-
fusion with the classical interpretation of the FAR (referred to the “zero-
effort” impostors), the term SFAR (spoof false acceptance rate) was in-
troduced in [42]. The SFAR represents the probability that an impostor
attempting a spoof attack is wrongly accepted as a genuine user. For in-
stance, if the “equal error rate” (EER) operational point, defined as the
point where the FRR equals the false acceptance rate (FAR), should be
chosen according to application requirements, the alternative choice sug-
gested in [42] to improve robustness is to choose the point where the FRR
equals the SFAR. Similar choices can be made for other application re-
quirements. In practice, this allows one to improve robustness against
spoofing attacks (namely, reducing the SFAR), at the expense of a higher
FRR. However, we do not adopt the term SFAR here, as it will be clear
from the context whether we refer to the percentage of accepted zero- or
non-zero-effort impostors.
The NIST Bozorth3 matching algorithm [64] was used for fingerprint verifi-
cation. It is based on matching the fingerprint minute details, called “minutiae”.
The Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) algorithm was used for face ver-
ification [93, 86]. It is based on representing a face with a graph whose nodes
are the so-called face “landmarks” (centred on the nose, eyes, and other points
detected on the face), are labelled by a feature vector, and are connected by
edges representing geometrical relationships among them. Face and fingerprint
matchers produced match scores in the range [0,1] and [0,990], respectively.
Since score normalization is necessary before using fusion rules at the score-
level, the fingerprint scores were normalized into the range [0,1] using the hy-
perbolic tangent method [78].
We investigated three attack scenarios: (a) only fingerprints are spoofed, (b)
only faces are spoofed, (c) both fingerprints and faces are spoofed (bimodal
or double spoofing). We also evaluated the “worst-case” attacks as defined in
[74, 73, 42]. Accordingly, the fake scores are fictitiously generated by randomly
drawing a set of match scores from those associated to the genuine users in the
testing set. We considered the fusion rules described in the Section 4.3.1: sum,
product, weighted sum (LDA), LLR, and Extended LLR.
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4.4 Experimental results
In this section, we discuss experimental analysis and results, whose main goals
are to investigate whether attacking only one sensor using real spoof attacks
allows the attacker to crack the multimoal biometric systems and to verify if
the “worst-case” hypothesis made in [74, 73, 42] holds for real spoof attacks,
namely, if it can be reliably exploited for predicting the performance drop under
spoof attacks.
4.4.1 Analysis of robustness against real spoof attacks
We, first, investigate: is the attacker able to evade the multimodal biometric
systems by forging at only one sensor via real spoof attacks?
The results are reported in Figures 4.3–4.8, in terms of Detection Error
Trade-off (DET) curves attained on the test set. A DET curve reports the
false rejection rate (FRR) as a function of the false acceptance rate (FAR), both
computed parametrically being equally the decision threshold (s∗) on the fused
score. Note that the FAR under a spoof attack is defined as the percentage of
spoof attempts that got accepted as genuine, which is also referred to as Spoof
FAR (SFAR) in [42].
We report the results on chimerical data sets, used in the experiment, as
follows: latex spoofed fingerprints and photo attack spoofed faces (Figure 4.3);
silicon spoofed fingerprints and personal photo attack spoofed faces (Figure
4.4); latex spoofed fingerprints and personal photo attack spoofed faces (Figure
4.5); silicon spoofed fingerprints and photo attack spoofed faces (Figure 4.6);
gelatin spoofed fingerprints and print attack spoofed faces (Figure 4.7); alginate
spoofed fingerprints and print attack spoofed faces (Figure 4.8). Each plot of
Figures 4.3–4.8 refers to a different score fusion rule, indicated in the title of
each plot.
From the Figures 4.3–4.8, it is easy to see that the multimodal biometric
systems can be cracked, using real spoof attacks, by attacking only one sensor,
even if the attacker does not fabricate a perfect replica of genuine user’s trait.
For instance, in Figure 4.3, using the weighted product rule (LDA), if the 1%
FAR operational point is chosen on the training set, an average FAR of 0.73%
is obtained on testing samples under normal operation. When only fingerprints
is spoofed using latex instead, the FAR increases to 64.91%; while in case of
only face spoofing using photo attacks, the FAR grows to 2.17%. This leads
to the validation of the results obtained in [74, 73, 42], though those results
were obtained under “worst-case” scenario, where the attacker was able to fab-
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Figure 4.3: Average DET curves attained on test set using latex spoofed fingerprints and photo
attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated in the tittle of
each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks (black), under real
spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks (dashed curves).
Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face and fingerprint
spoofing.
ricate exact replica of spoofed traits. Similar phenomenon can be noted in other
plots of Figures 4.3–4.8 corresponding to different fusion rules. Thus, we can
conclude that multimodal biometric systems are not intrinsically robust against
spoof attacks, as they can be cracked by spoofing only one biometric.
4.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 51
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
Product
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
LDA
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
LLR
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
Extended LLR
Figure 4.4: Average DET curves attained on test set using silicon spoofed fingerprints and
personal photo attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated
in the tittle of each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks
(black), under real spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks
(dashed curves). Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face
and fingerprint spoofing.
Additionally, in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we report the performance attained on
data set used for Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, by all fusion rules, including
the sum rule, for different operating points (i.e., decision thresholds). This al-
lows us to better understand the above discussion and to compare more directly
52 CHAPTER 4. REAL SPOOF ATTACKS AGAINST MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
Product
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
LDA
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
LLR
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
102
FAR (%)
FR
R
 (%
)
Extended LLR
Figure 4.5: Average DET curves attained on test set using latex spoofed fingerprints and per-
sonal photo attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated
in the tittle of each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks
(black), under real spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks
(dashed curves). Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face
and fingerprint spoofing.
performance (in terms of FAR and FRR) and robustness to spoof attacks (in
terms of SFAR) of the different fusion rules, besides making the results better
accessible. Furthermore, the tables also give information about the standard
deviation of FRR, FAR and SFAR, which is not provided by the DET curves.
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Figure 4.6: Average DET curves attained on test set using silicon spoofed fingerprints and photo
attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated in the tittle of
each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks (black), under real
spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks (dashed curves).
Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face and fingerprint
spoofing.
We considered the following three operating points: EER (when FAR=FRR),
FAR=1%, FAR=0.1%. Each operating point was fixed on the DET curve ob-
tained without spoof attacks, namely, the one attained by considering genuine
users and zero-effort impostors. The FRR at each selected operating point is
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Figure 4.7: Average DET curves attained on test set using gelatin spoofed fingerprints and print
attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated in the tittle of
each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks (black), under real
spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks (dashed curves).
Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face and fingerprint
spoofing.
reported in the first column of Tables 4.2 and 4.3 (no spoof ). Then, we com-
puted the SFAR attained by the different spoof attacks at the same operating
point (reported in the remaining columns). This indeed provides a complete
understanding of performance and robustness of each fusion rule: once the op-
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Figure 4.8: Average DET curves attained on test set using alginate spoofed fingerprints and print
attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different score fusion rules, indicated in the tittle of
each plot. Each plot contains the DET curves attained with no spoof attacks (black), under real
spoof attacks (solid curves) and under simulated “worst-case” spoof attacks (dashed curves).
Red: fingerprint spoofing only. Blue: face spoofing only. Green: both face and fingerprint
spoofing.
erating point is fixed, the effect of spoofing is only to increase the FAR (actually,
the SFAR) as it only affects impostor matching scores, while the FRR remains
constant.
Let us now compare the different fusion rules used in these experiments. It
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Rule no spoof face w-face fing. w-fing. both
EER % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 9.98±2.1 33.25±3.9 37.82±3.8 44.07±4.8 79.85±3.8 60.89±2.9
Product 3.49±1.4 5.72±2.1 6.43±2.2 70.06±5.4 96.11±1.8 73.10±4.9
LDA 3.32±1.5 8.39±4.3 9.87±4.8 70.79±5.6 96.36±2.2 74.09±5.4
LLR 3.60±1.4 5.58±2.8 6.36±3.2 71.41±5.1 96.46±2.2 73.47±5.1
Ext. LLR 3.61±1.4 5.64±2.7 6.40±3.1 71.49±5.0 96.38±2.2 73.57±5.1
FRR % at FAR=1% SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 17.41±3.2 15.58±1.6 20.46±1.9 28.38±5.2 69.00±6.1 46.00±3.8
Product 5.15±2.7 1.93±0.4 2.28±0.5 63.22±4.7 94.37±3.1 66.57±4.4
LDA 5.05±2.6 2.17±0.5 2.73±0.7 64.91±4.7 95.12±3.1 67.83±4.6
LLR 5.46±2.6 1.22±0.4 1.43±0.5 64.94±4.7 95.22±3.1 66.38±4.7
Ext. LLR 5.63±2.8 1.17±0.4 1.38±0.5 64.68±4.8 94.94±3.3 66.03±4.8
FRR % at FAR=0.1% SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 22.76±3.5 8.84±1.1 12.68±1.5 21.65±4.9 62.68±6.7 37.30±3.9
Product 8.59±4.1 0.30±0.1 0.36±0.1 53.41±5.5 90.62±4.1 56.79±4.9
LDA 7.99±3.7 0.26±0.1 0.32±0.2 56.32±5.3 92.45±3.8 58.66±5.2
LLR 8.91±4.1 0.14±0.1 0.17±0.1 56.23±6.0 92.39±3.9 57.48±6.0
Ext. LLR 9.46±5.2 0.16±0.1 0.19±0.1 56.13±5.7 90.97±5.5 57.27±6.0
Table 4.2: EER, FRR at FAR=1%, and FRR at FAR=0.1% for the considered fusion rules on
latex spoofed fingerprints and photo attack spoofed faces (no spoof ). The SFAR corresponding
to the same operating points is reported for real spoofing of fingerprint (fing.), face (face), and
both traits (both), and under simulated worst-case spoofing of fingerprint (w-fing.), and face
(w-face). Results are averaged over 25 runs and reported as mean and standard deviation.
shows that standard rules (Sum, Product, LDA and LLR) did not exhibit ap-
preciable performance differences, both in the case of spoof attacks against
only one biometric (either face or fingerprint), and of double spoofing. In other
words, they exhibited a similar robustness. It is worth noting that the Extended
LLR exhibited a significantly worse performance than standard rules, despite
it was specifically designed to be robust under spoofing attacks. This behavior
seems due to the fact that the worst-case assumption behind this rule turned out
to be too pessimistic. Note also that, as pointed out in Section 4.3.1, another
problem of Extended LLR is that setting its parameters (α, c1 and c2 for a multi-
modal systems composed of two traits) is not trivial, as their values can only be
hypothesized in advance (and, for instance, not tuned on some validation data).
Further, we extend our investigation to evaluate the two common beliefs
about the robustness of multimodal biometric systems: First, multimodal bio-
metric systems can be more robust than each corresponding unimodal system,
even in the case when all biometric traits are spoofed. Second, multimodal sys-
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Rule no spoof face w-face fing. w-fing. both
EER % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 15.14±3.2 19.80±6.0 43.97±5.2 18.56±2.7 66.45±6.9 21.75±6.9
Product 1.89±0.7 2.55±1.5 3.88±1.3 24.32±5.2 96.82±1.1 25.61±15.1
LDA 1.70±0.7 1.50±0.9 2.31±1.7 22.21±6.3 96.80±1.7 20.91±14.7
LLR 1.78±0.7 1.96±1.2 2.67±1.1 25.57±5.7 97.46±1.0 24.45±14.8
Ext. LLR 1.79±0.7 1.95±1.2 2.60±1.0 25.50±5.6 97.44±1.1 24.43±14.8
FRR % at FAR=1% SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 28.82±6.2 1.68±0.7 21.47±2.5 2.25±0.8 42.40±11.7 2.27±2.0
Product 2.49±1.2 1.25±0.5 2.16±0.3 19.54±4.7 95.95±1.7 20.51±13.6
LDA 2.56±1.3 0.98±0.4 1.47±0.6 19.40±5.2 96.42±1.8 18.52±13.2
LLR 2.29±1.1 1.02±0.4 1.43±0.2 21.32±5.1 96.82±1.6 20.40±14.0
Ext. LLR 2.29±1.1 1.02±0.4 1.43±0.2 21.32±5.1 96.75±1.5 20.36±13.9
FRR % at FAR=0.1% SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR % SFAR %
Sum 35.35±6.5 0.18±0.2 14.04±1.9 0.55±0.4 33.61±11.6 0.64±1.2
Product 4.69±1.8 0.12±0.1 0.34±0.1 9.25±3.6 92.56±2.7 9.05±8.5
LDA 4.36±1.8 0.10±0.1 0.18±0.1 10.17±3.9 94.18±2.4 9.30±8.9
LLR 4.56±1.9 0.08±0.1 0.13±0.0 10.03±4.5 94.01±2.6 9.17±8.8
Ext. LLR 8.28±7.6 0.10±0.1 0.17±0.0 9.61±3.9 84.95±16.4 9.04±8.4
Table 4.3: EER, FRR at FAR=1%, and FRR at FAR=0.1% for the considered fusion rules on
silicon spoofed fingerprints and personal photo attack spoofed faces (no spoof ). The SFAR
corresponding to the same operating points is reported for real spoofing of fingerprint (fing.),
face (face), and both traits (both), and under simulated worst-case spoofing of fingerprint (w-
fing.), and face (w-face). Results are averaged over 25 runs and reported as mean and standard
deviation.
tems can be cracked by spoofing all the fused traits, even when the attacker is
not able to fabricate an exact replica of the genuine user’s traits.
For this purpose, in Figure 4.9 we show the DET curves of the unimodal
and the multimodal systems under normal operation (i.e., with no spoof attack),
using solid curves, and the performance under a spoof attack against one trait
(both for the unimodal and multimodal systems) and both traits (for the mul-
timodal systems), using dashed curves. For reference, we also report the DET
curve corresponding to a “worst-case” attack against both traits, which was sim-
ulated as in [74, 73, 42]. Note that the latter DET curve corresponds to the line
FAR = FRR, as the match score distribution of fake traits is assumed to be iden-
tical to the one of genuine users. Note also that the red (fingerprint individual
system) and green curves (face individual system), as well as the black dashed
curve (“worst-case” attack against both traits of the multi-modal system) are the
same in all plots. Therefore, only the two blue curves corresponding to multi-
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Figure 4.9: Average DET curves obtained in our experiments on the testing set using silicon
spoofed fingerprints and photo attack spoofed faces. Each plot refers to a different fusion rule,
and contains DET curves of the systems under normal operation (solid curves) and under spoof
attacks (dashed curves). Green: unimodal face system. Red: unimodal fingerprint system.
Blue: multimodal face and fingerprint system (a spoof attack against both traits is considered).
Black: multimodal system under a simulated “worst-case” spoof attack against both traits.
modal systems without spoof attacks, and with realistic spoof attacks against
both traits, change depending on the fusion rule.
We can first observe that, under normal operation (i.e., no spoof attacks), in-
formation fusion has improved the performance of the corresponding unimodal
systems, except using sum and weighted sum score fusion rules, at high FAR
vales. This behavior is due to the fact that the genuine and impostor score
distributions of the face matcher in the considered data set turned out to be
more overlapping than the ones produced by the fingerprint matcher (see Fig-
ures 4.11 and 4.12), and it can be noted from the worse DET curves obtained by
the individual face system with respect to the individual fingerprint system. In
other words, generally the benefit of fusion are exploited when the fused match-
ers show complementary nature. However, since in this case the performance
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Figure 4.10: Fusion of face and fingerprint matching scores through product (top) and sum
(bottom). The values attained by the two fusion rules are shown in different colors. Genuine
and impostor scores for fingerprint spoof attacks and face spoof attacks are also reported to
highlight how the product rule may outperform the sum rule.
of the face matcher was considerably worse over all the DET curve than that
of the fingerprint matcher, and this performance imbalance clearly degraded
the performance of the multimodal system using sum rule below the best per-
forming matcher. But, this performance imbalance phenomenon did not affect
product rule (although one may think that the product rule should be similarly
affected), as exemplified in Figure 4.10. In fact, the (hyperbolic) decision func-
tions provided by the product rule correctly assigned a very low match score
to the majority of impostors, biased by the very low output of the fingerprint
matcher. Conversely, on average, the sum rule increased their score, worsening
the performance.
Let’s now compare the DET curves related to the real spoof attacks against
unimodal and multimodal systems in Figure 4.9, thus providing the evidence to
the common claim that multimodal biometric systems are more robust to spoof
attacks than unimodal ones. As it is easy to see that the performance of the mul-
timodal system under a real spoof attacks against both traits is better than the
one attained by both unimodal systems under attack, for all score fusion rules,
though the performance under attack considerably worsen both for the unimodal
face and fingerprint system. In other words, an attacker has lower chances to
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evade the multimodal systems considered in our experiments, when he spoofs
both traits, than to evade each single unimodal system. Accordingly, we can say
that the multimodal systems considered in our experiments exhibited a higher
robustness to real spoof attacks against both traits, than the corresponding uni-
modal systems against the same attacks.
However, a comparison of the solid blue (normal operation) and dashed blue
(real spoof attacks) curves clearly shows that the performance of the multimodal
systems under a real spoof attacks against both traits is significantly worse than
under normal operation, for all the fusion rules considered in this study. This
indicates that the probability of an impostor evading the multimodal systems is
high, even if the attacker does not fabricate a perfect replica of the spoofed trait,
namely under non-worst scenarios. For instance, using the LLR score fusion
rule, in Figure 4.9, at ZeroFAR operational point on the training set (namely,
the lowest decision threshold s∗, which provides a zero percent “zero-effort”
impostor acceptance rate on training samples) under normal operation, an aver-
age FAR of 0.31% is obtained on test sets. When both face and fingerprints are
spoofed (“non-zero” effort impostor) instead, the FAR increases to 55.01%.
To sum up, we provided experimental evidences that multimodal biometric
systems are not intrinsically robust against spoof attacks as believed so far. They
can be fooled by spoofing only one biometric, even when the attacker is not
able to fabricate the exact replica a genuine user’s trait. However, multimodal
systems are more robust to spoof attacks than corresponding unimodal systems
that compose them.
4.4.2 “Worst-case” hypothesis validation
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that state-of-the-art method
to evaluate the security of the multimodal biometric systems against spoof at-
tacks is to hypothesize spoof attacks under the “worst-case” scenario, where
the attacker is able to replicating exactly the targeted biometric. However, this
“worst-case” hypothesis may not be always true for all biometrics in real-life
scenarios, as also pointed out in [42]. Therefore, in this section, we evaluate to
what extend the “worst-case” scenario is realistic, and thus analyzing to what
extent the drop of performance under “worst-case” attack scenario is represen-
tative of the performance under real spoof attacks.
From Figure 4.3, it is easy to see that the “worst-case” assumption is realistic
when faces are spoofed by the photo attack and print attack data sets, using an
image similar to the template: the fake score distributions are very close to the
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ones of genuine users (see Figure 4.12). This is also true for the corresponding
values in Table 4.2 (face and w-face columns). Thus, modelling fake score
distributions as genuine ones, as proposed in [73], seems acceptable in this
scenario. The same does not hold however for latex-based fake fingerprints,
which are nevertheless the highest quality (and most effective) fake fingerprints
obtained in our data sets: as it can be seen by plots in Figure 4.3 and from
the values in Table 4.2 (fing. and w-fing. columns), the corresponding FAR is
clearly overestimated by the “worst-case” assumption (being equal the FRR),
with the only exception of the Extended LLR rule.
A similar behaviour to that described above can be noted in Figure 4.4. In
particular, in this case, the spoofed traits were less effective than in the previous
case, resulting in a stronger violation of the “worst-case” assumption. As the
differences between the FAR attained under the “worst-case” assumption, and
the one observed on our data sets, is even higher, both for spoofed faces and for
spoofed fingerprints. In the case of face spoofing, the performance is very close
to the one attained without a spoof attack. In the case of fingerprint spoofing, the
performance is remarkably far both from the one attained in the “worst-case”
scenario, and the one attained without spoof attacks.
Similarly, it can also be seen in Figure 4.9 that the performance attained
by the multimodal systems under real spoof attacks against both traits is much
better (although still not suitable for the requirements of security applications)
than the one predicted under the “worst-case” assumption (black dashed line).
For the sake of completeness, and to further confirm the results of the evalu-
ation carried out in this chapter, we also report here the matching score distribu-
tions of the genuine, impostor, and fake traits, for each fingerprint and face data
set, obtained by the Bozorth3 and EBGM matching algorithms, respectively, in
Figures 4.11 and 4.12.
The “worst-case” scenario hypothesized in [74, 73, 42] amounts to assuming
that the distribution of the fake traits corresponds to that of the genuine users.
But, above we have already pointed out that this hypothesis can be violated,
leading to a too pessimistic evaluation of the FAR of multimodal biometric
systems under spoof attacks. The score matching distributions in Figures 4.11
and 4.12 confirm the above discussed results, which are summarized as follows:
1. The “worst-case” assumption is too pessimistic and unrealistic in the case
of fingerprint spoofing, even when the fake fingerprints are constructed
with the consensual method, as in all our data sets (Figure 4.11). The
reason is that the fingerprint image obtained by a fake fingerprint often
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Figure 4.11: Score matching distributions for the fingerprint data sets: Top (left): fake finger-
prints obtained by using silicon. Top (right): fake fingerprints obtained by using latex. Bottom
(left): fake fingerprints obtained by using gelatin. Bottom (right): fake fingerprints obtained by
using alginate.
presents artifacts which affect the matching algorithm; for instance, not all
minutiae points can be perfectly replicated from the source image. Never-
theless, the distributions of the fake matching scores may still significantly
worsen the performance with respect to the “zero-effort” impostor distri-
bution, although not to the extent predicted by the “worst-case” hypothesis
in [74, 42]; in particular, this is true when gelatin and latex are used (Figure
4.11).
2. Conversely, the “worst-case” assumption is well suited to face spoofing,
provided that the fakes are constructed with images that are very similar
to the stored templates, as in the case of the Photo Attack and Print At-
tack data sets (see Figure 4.12). The reason is that printing a face image
on paper, or displaying it on a laptop screen, does not generate any par-
ticular artifact which affects the matching algorithm. However, this does
not exclude that some particular artifacts may exist (e.g., printing failures
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Figure 4.12: Score matching distributions for the face data sets. Top (left): fake faces obtained
by a photo attack (Photo Attack data set). Top (right): fake faces obtained by a personal photo
voluntarily provided by the user (Personal Photo Attack data set). Bottom: fake faces obtained
by a print attack (Print Attack data set).
or blurring), and, indeed, they can be successfully exploited for liveness
detection [10, 82, 95]. This is however not the case, when face images
significantly different than the stored templates are used, e.g., when they
are collected through the Web, as in the Personal Photo Attack (see Figure
4.12).
To conclude this section, we can state that above results provide evidence
that modelling the matching score distribution of spoof attacks using the “worst-
case” assumption of [74, 73, 42] is not always suitable for evaluating the ro-
bustness of multimodal systems, and for developing robust score fusion rules.
Moreover, they also showed that producing very effective fake faces may be
relatively easier for an attacker. This is in agreement with the results of the
Competition on Countermeasures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks [6, 10], and
further highlights the need for effective liveness detection techniques against
face spoofing.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the problem of spoof attacks against multimodal
biometric verification systems. In particular, we focused on a multimodal sys-
tem consisting of a fingerprint and a face matcher.
The state-of-the-art method to assess the security of a multimodal biometric
system against spoof attacks is a “worst-case” scenario in which the attacker is
able to replicate perfectly the genuine biometric traits, and thus the fake score
distribution is identical to the one of genuine users [74, 73, 42]. This lead to
the conclusion that multimodal biometric systems are not intrinsically robust
against spoof attacks, as they can be cracked by spoofing only one biomet-
ric. However, “worst-case” scenario may not be always true for all biometrics.
Thus, we presented an extensive experimental analysis involving real spoof at-
tacks to provide the further evidence to the concussion drawn in [74, 73, 42]. In
addition, our experiments on real spoof attacks also provided evidence of two
common beliefs about the robustness of multimodal biometric systems. First,
they can be more robust than each corresponding unimodal system, even when
all the fused biometric traits are spoofed. Second, their performance under a
spoof attack against all traits is still unacceptable for security applications. In
other words, they can be cracked by spoofing all the fused traits, even when the
attacker is not able to fabricate an exact replica of the genuine user’s traits.
Through experiments carried out on several face and fingerprints real spoof
attacks and using five different score fusion rules (including the one of [74]),
we found that a “worst-case” scenario can not be representative of real spoof
attacks: its suitability may depend on the specific biometric trait, the matching
algorithm, and the techniques used to fabricate the spoofed traits. In particular,
we found that the above “worst-case” assumption can be too pessimistic, thus
resulting in a significant overestimation of the FAR that a multimodal system
may incur under a real spoof attack. This can also undermine the effective-
ness of score fusion rules based on such assumption, like the one of [74], that
turned out to be less effective than standard rules like Product, LDA and LLR.
More details of the work presented in this chapter can be found in the following
publications [2, 8, 9].
Our empirical analysis suggests an interesting open issue of investigating
the development of more realistic models of the score distribution produced by
spoof attacks, aimed both at assessing the robustness of multimodal systems,
and designing novel and robust score fusion rules. In the next chapter we ad-
dress this open issue.
Chapter 5
Method for Evaluating the Security of
Multimodal Biometric Systems
against Spoof Attacks
5.1 Introduction
As described in previous chapter, state-of-the-art method to evaluate the security
of multimodal systems against spoof attacks is “worst-case” scenario, where the
fake distribution is simulated by assuming that attacker is able to replicate ex-
actly the targeted biometric: in other words, the fake score distribution coincides
with that of genuine users. But, this methods suffer from the main drawback of
inability to reasonably approximate performance of the system under real spoof
attacks, due to operation at stringent “worst-case” hypothesis. Moreover, our
empirical results in chapter 4 showed that the drop of performance predicted
under spoof attacks with the “worst-case” scenario is not always realistic.
A straightforward approach could be to fabricate fake traits to evaluate the
security of the system under design. However, constructing reliable fake repli-
cas is a cumbersome task, and fabricating fakes exhibiting different “quality”
degrees is even more difficult and impractical [52, 94, 57, 50]. A potential
alternative is to develop methods based on simulating the distribution of fake
biometric traits. Thus, it is crucial to develop evaluation methodologies that
allow assessing the robustness of multimodal biometric systems depending on
the particular biometric traits, the score fusion rule used, and the “quality” of
the fake traits used by the attacker, which in real scenarios are likely to be
not perfect replicas of the genuine traits. Due to complication in fabricating
the real spoof attacks, it is strongly desirable that the use of such methodolo-
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gies requires only samples of genuine and impostor users, which are the unique
samples commonly available to the designer of a biometric system. The need
for a methodology to evaluate the robustness of a multimodal biometric sys-
tems against spoof attacks without actual fabrication of spoof attacks was also
highlighted in Chapter 3, where we reviewed several works which assessed the
robustness of multimodal systems using simulated spoof attacks, and in Chap-
ter 4, where we evaluated the performance of the systems against real spoof
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic research effort has been
carried out toward this direction yet in the literature.
Thus, in this chapter our gaol is to develop a general methodology to evaluate
the robustness of a multimodal biometric system in adversarial environments at
the design phase, where the concept of “security” is related to the performance
degradation a biometric system incurs when it is under spoof attack. We first
present in Section 5.1.1 the rationale underlying our methodology, which is
then described in Sections 5.2–5.3. Eventually, in Sections 5.4–5.5, we present
experimental results on data set comprised of real spoof attacks to evaluate the
capability of our methods to approximate score distributions produced by real
spoof attacks, to reliably assess the robustness of multimodal systems under
attacks, and then accordingly to predict the relative robustness of several score-
level fusion rules, namely the ranking of their performance under attacks.
5.1.1 Goal and scope of the proposed method
Based on above mentioned motivations in section 5.1 and experimental evi-
dences of Chapter 4, we propose a method to evaluate the security (robustness)
of multimodal systems against spoof attack, which is aimed at addressing the
open issue (c) stated in Chapter 3 Section 3.5, i.e., How can the security of
multimodal systems be evaluated, under realistic attacks, without fabricating
spoofed traits?
In this chapter, our goals are: (i) To evaluate the capability of our proposed
models for fake score distribution to approximate real fake score distributions.;
(ii) To investigate whether our proposed performance evaluation method pro-
vides a good estimate of the performance of biometric systems under spoof at-
tacks.; (iii) To predict the FAR of different score-level fusion rules under spoof
attacks, namely the ranking of their performance under attacks.
In order to avoid the straightforward but cumbersome solution of construct-
ing spoofed biometric traits to test the system, our method is based on simu-
lating the effects of a spoof attack on the distribution of corresponding match
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scores, as in [74, 73, 42]. However, differently from these works, our aim is
to take into account also more realistic, non-worst case scenarios, in which the
fake score distribution can be different than the genuine one. When a fake trait
is submitted to a biometric matcher, several factors may affect the resulting
output score distribution, like the particular biometric trait spoofed, the particu-
lar matching algorithm used, the forgery technique used by the attacker, and the
skills of the attacker, etc. However, at the state-of-the-art their effect on position
and shape of score distribution is unknown. Thus, we make substantive assump-
tions on the potential form and shape it can get and thus propose to model such
distribution by assuming the effect of the above factors that they can exhibit
different shapes, and in particular, that it can be identical either to the impostor
or to the genuine score distributions, or lies between them. We model the fake
score distribution as a function of the genuine and impostor distributions, on the
basis of a single parameter, that we call “attack strength”. This parameter con-
trols the degree of similarity of the fake and genuine scores, with respect to the
impostor scores. The “attack strength” quantifies the effect of several factors
mentioned above, and allow to figure out more possible scenarios than that of
the only worst-case one in [74, 73, 42]. The “attack strength” parameter quan-
tifies the ability of the attacker to fabricate a fake biometric trait that mimics
the true trait: the higher the similarity, the higher the “attack strength” of the
spoof attack. To evaluate the robustness of a system under spoof attacks using
our method, the testing impostor scores of the matcher under attack have to be
replaced with simulated fake scores generated as mentioned above. Repeating
this procedure for different values of the “attack strength” parameter allows the
designer to evaluate robustness under attack scenarios characterised by differ-
ent degrees of similarity of the fake and genuine score distributions, namely, to
evaluate robustness against different attackers which are able to fabricate more
or less good replicas of true biometric traits, thus providing an estimation of the
system performance under potential spoof attacks of different strength.
In summary, the approach we propose consists in simulating the effect of a
spoof attack at the matcher’s output, by modelling the distribution of the scores
produced by submitting fake traits to the biometric system. This approach can
be used to analyze the robustness of biometric authentication systems against
spoof attacks, under one or more possible forms that the fake score distribution
may take, in the following scenarios:
1. Analysis of the performance of a given individual matcher.
2. Analysis of the performance of a given multimodal system, namely, anal-
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ysis of a given set of matchers and a given score fusion rule.
3. Comparison of different multimodal systems made up by the same set of
matchers, using different score fusion rules, namely, ranking of score fu-
sion rules according to their robustness to spoof attacks.
5.2 Models of the Match Score Distribution produced
by Spoof Attacks
In the following, we describe our proposed two models of fake scores distribu-
tions to simulate the spoof attacks at match score level: Non-Parametric model
and Parametric model.
5.2.1 Non-parametric model
In real-life frameworks it is reasonable to assume that the score distribution
of fake traits may be different than the genuine one, and it may take different
forms, depending on factors like the one mentioned in Section 5.1.1.
To develop a model of the fake scores distribution it would be very useful
to start from empirical data. However, although several data sets of live and
fake biometric traits currently exist, but they do not provide useful information
on the score distribution of fake traits, since they have not been indexed by the
users’ identity. To our knowledge, the only exception is the data set of [1],
which however is rather small and not publicly available.
The solution we propose is to make a working assumption on the possible
forms that the fake scores distribution may exhibit, due to the possible effects of
the different factors mentioned in Section 5.1.1. In the following we denote with
s the score of a biometric matcher, and with G and I the events that the input
biometric is true and comes respectively from a genuine user and an impostor,
while the event that it is a fake biometric will be denoted as F. The correspond-
ing score distributions will thus be denoted as p(s|G),p(s|I) and p(s|F). Our
working assumptions on the form of p(s|F) are the following:
1. In the worst case for the system (and it is the best case for the attacker),
the attacker is able to fabricate exact replicas of the targeted biometric trait,
and thus the distribution of fake scores is identical to the one of genuine
user: p(s|F)= p(s|G). This is the only scenario considered in [74, 73, 42].
2. In the best case for the system (worst case for the attacker), the fake trait
is very different from the one of the targeted genuine user, such that the
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attacker does not get a better result than if he submitted his own original
trait. Accordingly, in tis case p(s|F) = p(s|I). We consider this as the
case of fakes with the worst quality. We don’t consider the case of fakes
exhibiting an even lower quality, leading to a score distribution worse (for
the attacker) than the impostor one: although it may be possible in practice,
it is obviously of no interest to the purpose of robustness evaluation.
3. In “intermediate” cases, we assume that p(s|F) lies between p(s|I) and
p(s|G), and model its possible shapes as discussed below.
In absence of more specific information on the possible shapes that the fake
score distribution may exhibit, we propose to simulate “intermediate” cases as
follows: we replace each impostor score sI with a fictitious score sF given by
sF = (1−α)sI+αsG , (5.1)
where sG is a randomly drawn genuine score, and α ∈ [0,1] is a parameter which
controls the degree of similarity of the distribution of fake scores to the one of
genuine scores, namely, a parameter that controls the relative distance of the
fake distribution to the ones of impostor and genuine users. The resulting dis-
tribution of fictitious fake scores p(s|F) is thus “intermediate” between the ones
of p(s|I) and p(s|G). By using different values of α, one gets different pos-
sible distributions: higher the α value, the closer p(s|F) to the genuine score
distribution p(s|G), and thus the more effective the spoof attack. Accordingly,
we name α as “attack strength”. This parameter, α, and related Eq. (5.1), are
aimed not to model the physical fake generation process, but only its effect on
the corresponding distribution p(s|F), which depends on several causes like the
spoof attacks carried out using different techniques, or attempted by different
attackers with different forgery skills, etc. For example, in the case of finger-
print, its “similarity” to the impostors distribution will be caused by several
factors as artefacts in the replica, the image distortion from the mould to the
cast, the good/bad pressure of the attacker on the sensor surface when placing
the spoofed fingerprint, whilst its “similarity” to the genuine users one is given
by the fact that several important features, as the ridge texture and minutiae
locations, will be the same of the correspondent subject.
5.2.2 Parametric model
We propose the second kind of simulation of the fake score distribution us-
ing a parametric model as follows. Based on the same working assumptions
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mentioned in Section 5.2.1 for non-parametric model, here we model p(s|F) in
“intermediate” cases using a parametric model based on a given distribution,
like a Gaussian, Gamma or Beta. We assume that p(s|F) has the same form
as p(s|G) and p(s|I), and that the value of each of its parameters is between
the values of the corresponding parameter in p(s|G) and p(s|I). For instance, if
p(s|G) and p(s|I) are modeled as Gaussians with mean and variance denoted as
µG,µI,σ2G and σ
2
I , we are assuming that p(s|F) is Gaussian as well, and that its
mean and variance satisfy the constraints:
µF ∈ [min{µG,µI},max{µG,µI}],
σF ∈ [min{σG,σI},max{σG,σI}]. (5.2)
In other words, we model the possible fake score distributions as a “morphing”
of the impostor distribution toward the genuine one. To simplify this model,
we further constrain the parameters of p(s|F) to satisfy a linear proportionality
constraint with respect to their range, with the same value of the coefficient. For
instance, in the case of Gaussian distributions this amounts to assume that the
mean and variance of p(s|F) is given by:
µF =αµG+ (1−α)µI,
σF =ασG+ (1−α)σI, (5.3)
for some α (“attack strength”) ∈ [0,1]. Note that α = 1 and α = 0 lead respec-
tively to the worst and best cases of assumptions 1 and 2 of Section 5.2.1.
Through the α parameter, our model allows one to take into account in the
simplest possible way all the above mentioned different factors which can affect
the fake scores distribution, in the absence of more precise information on their
impact. In the next section we show how to apply this model to assess the
robustness of a biometric system against spoof attacks, and also how to use to
predict the ranking of different score fusion rules of a multimodal biometric
system, according to their robustness to spoof attacks.
5.3 Security Evaluation Method for Multimodal Biomet-
ric Systems against Spoof Attacks
Based on the models of the fake score distribution described above, we propose
the procedure summarized as Algorithm 1 to evaluate the security (robustness)
of a multimodal biometric system, under spoof attacks against one or more of
the component matchers.
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Algorithm 1 Procedure for evaluating the security of multimodal biometric systems against
spoof attacks
Inputs:
• A multimodal system made up of N matchers;
• A training set (Gtr, Itr) and a testing set (Gts, Its) made up of N -dimensional matching
score vectors coming from genuine and impostor users;
• f (s;θ f ) ∈ {G,I}: a score fusion rule with parameters θ f (including the decision thresh-
old), where s is an input score vector and G and I denote the labels corresponding to the
‘genuine’ and ‘impostor’ decision;
• Pˆ (·|θ): a parametric model of the class-conditional genuine and impostor score distribu-
tions (for parametric model only);
• α1, . . . ,αn: a set of attack strength values for the n matchers subject to a simulated spoof
attack.
Output: The system’s performance under a simulated spoof attack to matchers 1, . . . ,n, with
attack strength values α1, . . . ,αn .
1: Set the parameters of f (s;θ f ) (if any) with the decision threshold, on training data (Gtr, Itr),
according to given performance requirements. For parametric model, also fit the model
Pˆ (·|θ) to testing data (Gts, Its), to approximate the genuine and impostor score distributions
Pˆ (S|G;θG) and Pˆ (S|I;θI).
2: For parametric model: Compute the fake score distribution Pˆ (S|F;θF) according to our
model, using Pˆ (S|G;θG) and Pˆ (S|I;θI), and then randomly draw a set Fts of scores from
Pˆ (S|F;θF), and replace the scores Its of the matcher under attack with Fts.
For non-parametric model: Replace the scores Its of the matcher under attack with a same
number of fictitious fake scores Fts generated by our model for given α values.
3: Evaluate the system’s performance on the scores (Gts,Fts), using the score fusion rule
f (s;θ f ).
First, the threshold of the score fusion rule (and its parameters, if any) has
to be estimated from training data, using the genuine and impostor score dis-
tributions, Gtr and Itr, according to application requirements (for instance, set-
ting a desired false acceptance rate (FAR) or genuine acceptance rate (GAR)
value. This defines the so-called operational point of the biometric system). To
evaluate the robustness (security) of the multimodal biometric system against a
spoof attack, we propose to replace the impostor scores Itr corresponding to the
matcher under attack with a set of fictitious fake scores Ftr, obtained from any
of our above proposed models. This procedure can be repeated for different α
values in the range [0,1], to get a complete picture of the system’s performance
as a function of the “attack strength”.
For any decision threshold value the FAR evaluated under a simulated spoof
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attack is likely to be higher than the FAR evaluated in the standard way, without
spoof attacks. The GAR remains unchanged instead, as spoof attacks do not af-
fect genuine scores. Accordingly, as the value of α increases, the corresponding
FAR is likely to increase from the values attained for α = 0, corresponding to
the absence of attacks, to the worst-case corresponding to α = 1. Namely, the
system’s performance is likely to decrease from the value attained for α= 0 to
the α= 1. Therefore, the above procedure allows one to assess how the system’s
performance degradation as the attack strength increases. The more gracefully
the performance degrades (namely, the higher the α value for which the FAR
drops below some value of interest), the more robust a system is. In particular, it
can be useful to figure out the amount of the relative “shift” (the corresponding
α value) of the impostor score distribution toward the genuine one, such that
the system’s performance (the FAR) drops below some given value.
Note that the above procedure can be carried out analitycally or numerically
for some fusion rules and some parametric model of the score distributions.
For instance, in the case of the LLR rule with Gaussian score distributions, the
expression of the FAR as a function of the decision threshold can be obtained
analitically (in integral form), and its evaluation can be done numerically, as
shown later in the this section. In general, the evaluation can always be carried
out empirically.
It is also worth noting that this performance evaluation procedure follows ba-
sically the standard procedure used in the biometric field. In fact, the standard
procedure evaluates the performance of a multimodal biometric system using a
training set (Gtr, Itr) and a testing set (Gts, Its) made up of N -dimensional match
score vectors coming from genuine and impostor users. The peculiarities of per-
formance evaluation implemented by Algorithm 1 concern the use of the attack
strength parameters (the parameters α) and the fact that the impostor scores of
the testing set are replaced by fictitious scores obtained from our models of the
fake score distribution in order to simulate the effects of a spoof attack.
The performance prediction under attack provided by the above method (Al-
gorithm 1), using our proposed models of fake score distribution in Sections
5.2.1 and 5.2.2, is useful, only if one can give a reasonable approximation of
the distribution of fake scores that a system will incur, which in practice is very
difficult. Accordingly, we extend our proposed Algorithm 1 proposing to apply
it to a different, possibly more useful, aim: to predict the relative robustness of
several score level fusion rules, namely the ranking of their performance under
attack for a range of different simulated distributions of fake scores. The main
goal of extended method is thus not to predict the FAR of different score fusion
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Algorithm 2 Prediction of the ranking of score fusion rules, based on their robustness against
spoof attacks.
• A multimodal system made up of N matchers;
• A training set (Gtr, Itr) and a testing set (Gts, Its) made up of N -dimensional matching
score vectors coming from genuine and impostor users;
• A set of score fusion rules;
• Pˆ (·|θ): a parametric model of the class-conditional genuine and impostor score distribu-
tions (for parametric model only);
• α1, . . . ,αn: a set of attack strength values for the n matchers subject to a simulated spoof
attack.
Output: The ranking of score fusion rules according to their predicted robustness to spoofing
attacks, as a function of the parameter α.
1: Set the parameters of f (s;θ f ) (if any) with the decision threshold, on training data (Gtr, Itr),
according to given performance requirements. For parametric model, also fit the model
Pˆ (·|θ) to testing data (Gts, Its), to approximate the genuine and impostor score distributions
Pˆ (S|G;θG) and Pˆ (S|I;θI).
2: for each α value do
3: For parametric model: Compute the fake score distribution Pˆ (S|F;θF) according to our
model, using Pˆ (S|G;θG) and Pˆ (S|I;θI), and then randomly draw a set Fts of scores from
Pˆ (S|F;θF), and replace the scores Its of the matcher under attack with Fts.
For non-parametric model: Replace the scores Its of the matcher under attack with a same
number of fictitious fake scores Fts generated by our model for given α values.
4: Evaluate the FAR of each score fusion rule on the scores (Gts,Fts).
5: Rank the score fusion rules according to their FAR.
6: end for
rules under a specific spoof attack, but their ranking with respect to a range of
potential attacks. Therefore, it can provide useful information to the designer
of a multimodal system about the relative robustness of different score fusion
rules to spoof attacks characterized by a different “effectiveness” (namely by
a fake score distribution more or less close to the one of genuine scores), thus
allowing the designer to choose the most robust one according to the model pre-
dictions. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. Using this method, the
corresponding FAR of each score fusion rule can be computed for each α value,
and the different rules can be ranked in terms of their predicted FAR. Finally,
the ranking of score fusion rules can be analyzed as a function of α.
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5.3.1 Case study: a bi-modal biometric system using LLR fusion
rule with Gaussian distributions
In this section, we show how to analitically/numerically evaluate the robustness
of a bi-modal biometric system against a spoof attack, when the score distri-
butions are modelled as Gaussians, and the LLR rule is used. We assume that
application requirements are given in terms of a desired FAR value.
The logarithm of the likelihood ratio for a system with two independent
scores with class-conditional Gaussian distributions, denoted with z(s1, s2), is
given by:
z(s1, s2)= log p(s1|G)p(s2|G)p(s1|I)p(s2|I) =
log
(
σIs1σIs2
σGs1σGs2
)
+ 12
[
(s1−µIs1 )2
σ2Is1
+ (s2−µIs2 )
2
σ2Is2
− (s1−µGs1 )
2
σ2Gs1
− (s2−µGs2 )
2
σ2Gs2
]
.
(5.4)
The decision function is given by sign
(
z(s1, s2)− log s∗
)
, where the value +1
means that the user is accepted as genuine, while a value of −1 means that he
is rejected as an impostor. The decision threshold s∗ has to be set so that the
desired FAR is attained. The region of the score space (s1, s2) corresponding to
genuine users, denoted as G , can be found analitically by solving the quadratic
inequality z(s1, s2)− log s∗ ≥ 0. The left-hand side of such inequality can be
rewritten by re-arranging the terms of Eq. 5.4, as:
z(s1, s2)− log s∗ = As21+Bs1s2+Cs22+Ds1+Es2+F, (5.5)
where the threshold s∗ is included in the term F . Depending on the value of
B2−4AC , the solution of z(s1, s2)− log s∗ = 0 corresponds to:
• B2−4AC < 0: an ellipse;
• B2−4AC = 0: a parabola;
• B2−4AC > 0: an hyperbola.
This allows to find analitycally the region G .
The FAR for a given s∗ value is defined as:
FAR(s∗)= ∫ ∫Gp(s1|I)p(s2|I)ds1ds2. (5.6)
The above integral can be computed numerically.
Now the threshold s∗ can be set to the value s∗∗ which gives the desired FAR
on training data. Assuming that s1 corresponds to the matcher subject to a spoof
attack, the corresponding FAR on testing data can be found as:
FAR(s∗∗)= ∫ ∫Gp(s1|F)p(s2|I)ds1ds2, (5.7)
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where p(s1|F) and p(s2|I) are now obtained from testing data as described in the
previous section. The above integral can be computed numerically as well.
5.3.2 Case study: a bi-modal system using Sum, Weighted sum
and Product fusion rules with Gaussian distributions
In last section, we have presented in detail how to compute the FAR of a bi-
modal biometric systems under attacks using LLR fusion rule. While, in this
section we show how to analytically/numerically evaluate the robustness of a
bi-modal systems against spoof attacks, when score distributions are modelled
as Gaussians, and the Sum/Weighted sum/Product score fusion rule is used.
Without loss of generality, let s, s∗∗ be fused score and the decision threshold
that has to set on training data so that desired operating FAR/GAR is obtained,
respectively.
Sum:
The FAR for a given s∗∗ is defined as:
FAR(s∗∗) =
∫ +∞
s∗∗
p(s|I)ds
= 1−
∫ s∗∗
−∞
p(s|I)ds
= 1−
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
s∗∗− (µIs1+µIs2)√
σ2Is1+σ2Is2
p
2


= 1
2
− 1
2
erf
s∗∗− (µIs1+µIs2)√
σ2Is1+σ2Is2
p
2
 (5.8)
where erf(x)= 2p
pi
∫ x
0 exp[−t2]dt ; which is so-called error function.
Weighted sum:
The weighted sum of two statistically independent and normally distributed ran-
dom variables is normal with mean equal to sum of weighted means and stan-
dard deviation equal to root of sum of squared weighted standard deviations.
The FAR of weighted sum fusion score rules could be defined as:
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FAR(s∗∗) =
∫ +∞
s∗∗
p(s|I)ds
= 1−
∫ s∗∗
−∞
p(s|I)ds
= 1−
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
s∗∗− (ωs1µIs1+ωs2µIs2)√
ω2s1σ
2
Is1
+ω2s2σ2Is2
p
2


= 1
2
− 1
2
erf
s∗∗− (ωs2µIs1+ωs2µIs2)√
ω2s1σ
2
Is1
+ω2s2σ2Is2
p
2
 (5.9)
Any optimal weight search algorithm can be opted to attain the best values
of weight ωs1 and ωs2.
Product:
The FAR of Product fusion score rule could be defined as:
FAR(s∗∗) =
∫ +∞
s∗∗
p(s|I)ds
=
{∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)ds2
∫ +∞
s∗∗
s2
p(s1|Is1)ds1
}
+
{∫ 0
−∞
p(s2|Is2)ds2
∫ s∗∗
s2
−∞
p(s1|Is1)ds1
}
=

∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)ds2
1−∫ s∗∗s2
−∞
1
σIs1
p
2pi
e
− (s1−µIs1 )
2
2σ2Is1 ds1
+
∫ 0
−∞
p(s2|Is2)ds2
∫ s∗∗s2
−∞
1
σIs1
p
2pi
e
− (s1−µIs1 )
2
2σ2Is1 ds1

=
{∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)ds2
[
1−
(
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
( s∗∗
s2
−µIs1
σIs1
p
2
))]}
+{∫ 0
−∞
p(s2|Is2)ds2
[(
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
( s∗∗
s2
−µIs1
σIs1
p
2
))]}
=
{
1
2
∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)ds2− 1
2
∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)erf
( s∗∗
s2
−µIs1
σIs1
p
2
)
ds2
}
+
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1
2
[
1−
∫ +∞
0
p(s2|Is2)ds2
]
+ 1
2
∫ 0
−∞
p(s2|Is2)erf
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σIs1
p
2
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ds2
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1
2
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2
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erf
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p(s2|Is2)erf
( s∗∗
s2
−µIs1
σIs1
p
2
)
ds2
}
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
p(s2|Is2)erf
( s∗∗
s2
−µIs1
σIs1
p
2
)
ds2 (5.10)
In order to compute the FAR under spoof attacks using Sum (Equation 5.8),
Weighted sum ((Equation 5.9) and Product (Equation 5.10) rules, the imposotor
distribution/parameters of corresponding matcher subject to spoof attack should
be replaced with distribution/parameters p(·|F) obtained from testing data set as
described in Section 5.3.
5.4 Evaluation of the Capability of proposed Models in
Approximating Score Distributions of Real Spoof
Attacks
In this section, we present a preliminary validation of our proposed models of
the fake score distribution of a single matchers, using the the data sets described
in Chapter 4 Section 4.2. We used silicon spoofed fingerprints and photo at-
tack spoofed faces. The fingerprint and the face recognition systems used in
the experiments were implemented using the minutiae-based Neurotechnologs
VeriFinger 6.0 [63] and the elastic bunch graph matching (EBGM) [93, 86],
respectively. More precisely, our aim here is to investigate whether our pro-
posed models of the fake score distribution can reasonably approximate score
distributions of real spoof attacks, for some α value.
In Figure 5.1 the histograms of genuine, impostor and fake scores computed
with the above mentioned data sets are shown. Notice in particular that the
histogram of scores associated to spoofed fingerprints is close to the impostor
78
CHAPTER 5. METHOD FOR EVALUATING THE SECURITY OF MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC
SYSTEMS AGAINST SPOOF ATTACKS
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
score
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
 
Genuine
Impostor
Fake
0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
score
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
 
Genuine
Impostor
Fake
Figure 5.1: Histograms of genuine, impostor and fake scores computed with photo attack
spoofed faces (top) and silicon spoofed fingerprints (bottom) data sets.
distribution, while the histogram of scores associated to faces is very close to
the genuine distribution, thus these distributions exhibiting two very different
degrees of “attack strength”. This provides a first, qualitative support to the
assumption behind our model, namely that different real fake score distributions
can lie at different relative “distances” from the genuine and impostor ones.
To investigate whether the score distributions of real spoof attacks shown in
Figure 5.1 can be reasonably approximated by our models, for some α value; we
evaluated the dissimilarity between them and the ones provided by our models,
as a function of the “attack strength” (α). Our goal is to check if a value of pa-
rameter α exists that minimizes the dissimilarity between the two distributions.
The simulated fictitious fake scores were obtained as described in Algorithm 1
using respective models. To assess the dissimilarity between the two distribu-
tions, we used the L1-norm Hellinger distance [49], also called “Class Separa-
tion Statistic” [39]. The L1-norm Hellinger distance between two probability
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Data set Hellinger distance α
Face 0.0939 0.9144
Fingerprint 0.4397 0.0522
Table 5.1: Minimum values of the Hellinger distance between the score distribution of real
spoof attacks and the one obtained by (Algorithm 1) using non-parametric model, as a function
of α, for the face and fingerprint data sets. The corresponding α value is also shown.
distribution functions f (x) and g (x),x ∈X can be measured as:∫
X
| f (x)− g (x)|dx.
It takes values in the range [0,2], where the values of 0 and 2 correspond to
identical and to fully separated distributions, respectively. Since this is a non-
parametric class separation statistic, it can be used for all possible distributions.
Table 5.1 reports the values of the parameter α which minimize the dissimi-
larity between the score distributions of real spoof attacks shown in Figure 5.1
and the one obtained by our method (Algorithm 1) using non-parametric model
(Equation 5.1). The corresponding distributions are depicted in Figure 5.2.
We can see in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 that our approximation is rather good
for the face data set. It is less good for the fingerprint data set instead, but it
could be still acceptable to the aim of evaluating the relative robustness of dif-
ferent score fusion rules in a multimodal biometric system, which is the final
aim of our models. Another way to say this is that the designer of a biometric
system in practice can not know in advance the shapes and positions of score
distributions of spoof attacks that will occur. Accordingly, the robustness (secu-
rity) of a multimodal system must be evaluated for several α values. The above
results provide a preliminary evidence that the simulated distributions one ob-
tained using our model, for different α values, can actually give reasonable
approximations of possible score distributions of real spoof attacks.
For the sake of completeness, we also evaluated the accuracy of our model
of fake score distribution in approximating the performance of the individual
matcher under attack, for the values of Table 5.1 that give the best approxima-
tion of the score distributions of real spoof attacks, although this is not the final
aim of this model as explained above.
To investigate the accuracy of the FAR approximated by our model, for all
possible values of the threshold; we compared the FAR of the unimodal system
attained under real spoof attacks with the FAR provided by our model. We
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Figure 5.2: Probability distributions of the scores of fake faces (top) and of fake fingerprints
(bottom) obtained from our data sets (blue), and obtained by our method for fake score simula-
tion (green), for the α value of Table 5.1.
selected FAR as performance measure because only the False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) value changes when the system is under a spoof attack, while the genuine
acceptance rate (GAR) remains unchanged, since it does not depend on the
match scores of the impostors, as also pointed out in Section 5.3.
Figure 5.3 depicts the FAR as a function of the threshold for the unimodal
biometric system when no spoof attack is included in the data set (i.e., using
only the genuine and impostor data; the “no attack” curve), under a real spoof
attack against the face (fingerprint) matcher (using the fake biometric traits of
our data set; the “real spoof attack” curve), and by a simulated spoof attack
(using the fake scores provided by our method with the α values of Table 5.1;
the “simulated attack” curve).
From Figure 5.3 (top), it is easy to see that our non-parametric model, in
the case of face spoofing, provides a quite accurate approximation of the FAR;
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Figure 5.3: FAR of the uni-modal biometric systems as a function of the threshold applied to
the score, when the data set does not contain spoof attacks (“no attack” curve), under a real
spoof attack against the face (top) or fingerprint (bottom) matcher (“real spoof attack” curve),
and under a spoof attack simulated with our method (“simulated attack” curve).
the maximum absolute difference between the real and the approximated FAR
is 0.02%. The FAR by our model, in the case of fingerprint spoofing (Figure
5.3, bottom), is overestimated by an amount of up to 0.03% for threshold values
lower than 0.502, while underestimated up to a larger amount for threshold
values greater than 0.502. This is due to the positive skewness of the real fake
fingerprint scores, as can bee seen in Figure 5.2.
However, the decision threshold corresponding to the zeroFAR operational
point (i.e. operational point such that the threshold leads to a zero FAR value on
training data, and maximizes the correspondent GAR value) is 0.500 (see Figure
5.1). Therefore, threshold values more than this one are out of the designer
interest and can be neglected. This also means that threshold values where the
real FAR is underestimated by our model can be neglected as well, since they
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Operational Real Approximated Approximated
point FAR FAR FAR
(our model) (worst-case assumption)
Face zeroFAR 0.048 0.042 0.114
System 1%FAR 0.235 0.233 0.243
Fingerprint zeroFAR 0.506 0.625 0.948
System 1%FAR 0.600 0.808 0.951
Table 5.2: Comparison between the FAR attained at the zeroFAR and 1% FAR operational
points by the unimodal biometric system under a real spoof attack (“real FAR”) and the FAR
approximated by our model (“approximated FAR”).
are localized for threshold values higher than 0.502.
Further we accordingly focused on high security operational points, in par-
ticular the zeroFAR and 1% FAR, which are very crucial in order to assess the
system security. The corresponding FAR attained by the fake score distribution
in our data set (“Real FAR”) and the approximated ones using our model is
reported in Table 5.2. In addition, for comparison we also report the approx-
imated FAR obtained using the “worst-case” assumption of [74, 73, 42]. The
reported results show that our method, at these operational points, provides a
good approximation of the performance under spoof attacks of the two con-
sidered unimodal biometric systems. The overestimation of the values for the
fingerprint system is in some sense beneficial, since it puts the biometric sys-
tem designer in the position to expect a performance decrease higher than that
occurring in the real case. In addition, it is worth noting that our model is more
flexible and appropriate for match score distributions of real spoof attacks quite
far from the “worst-case” one, as happens for fingerprints.
Similar results were obtained using parametric model (Equation 5.3) with
Gaussian (normal) distribution, as shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4. Re-
Data set Hellinger distance α
Face 0.2110 1.0000
Fingerprint 0.4013 0.0356
Table 5.3: Minimum values of the Hellinger distance between the score distribution of real
spoof attacks and the one obtained by (Algorithm 1) using parametric model with Gaussian
distribution, as a function of α, for the face and fingerprint data sets. The corresponding α
value is also shown.
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Figure 5.4: Probability distributions of the scores of fake faces (top) and of fake fingerprints
(bottom) obtained from our data sets (yellow), and obtained by our method for fake score sim-
ulation (blue), for the α value of Table 5.3.
sults with parametric model using Gaussian is less approximate than with non-
parametric model, since the real distributions are skewed, a better approxima-
tion could be obtained by using a Gamma or Beta distribution.
To sum up, our preliminary results provide some evidence that our model are
able to reasonably approximate score distributions of real spoof attacks.
5.5 Evaluation of proposed Security Evaluation Method
on Multimodal Biometric Systems
In the last Section, we showed that our proposed models of the fake score dis-
tributions are capable of approximating reasonably the score distributions pro-
duced by real spoof attacks. In this section, we examine the accuracy of our
models and methods in approximating the performance of the multimodal bio-
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metric systems under spoof attacks.
We will begin with investigation to check whether our proposed security
evaluation method (Algorithm 1) provides a good estimate of the performance
of a multimodal biometric system when any one of the biometric trait is spoofed.
Then further we will analyze in detail the impact of spoof attacks on LLR fusion
rule. Finally, we will carry out the empirical study using Algorithm 2 to predict
the relative robustness of several score-level fusion rules, namely the ranking of
their performance under spoof attack.
5.5.1 Performance estimation of multimodal biometric systems un-
der spoof attack
In the previous Section, we have shown that our method using non-parametric
model allows to approximate well a given score distribution of fake biometric
traits and the performance of a unimodal biometric system under real spoof at-
tacks. While in this section we evaluate whether the Algorithm 1 proposed in
Section 5.3 gives a good approximation of performance of a multimodal sys-
tem made up of the face and fingerprints matchers, when any one of the two
traits is spoofed. We carried out the experiments using Algorithm 1 with para-
metric model (Equation 5.3) using Gaussian distribution. Note that when the
score distribution of real spoof attack is unknown, the designer does not have
any knowledge of the attack strength and, therefore, he/she should use our Al-
gorithm 1 to evaluate performance as a function of the fake quality parameter
α. But, for the data set used we also have the fake score distribution, and we
know from Table 5.3, what are the α values that provide the best approximation
of such distribution, and, therefore, we used such values in this experiment. It
is worth noting that this does not make our results lose any generality.
In these experiments we used the LLR as the score fusion rule, and assumed
that the face and fingerprint scores are conditionally independent. The interest
on the LLR rule is motivated by three main reasons: it is widely used in mul-
timodal systems; it is the optimal rule when the score distributions are exactly
known (in the sense that it gives the minimum false rejection rate, FRR, for any
given FAR value, and vice-versa); its robustness to spoof attacks has already
been questioned in previous works [74, 73].
The performance under a spoof attack was evaluated by replacing all the
impostor scores with the fake scores associated to the spoof attacks in our data
sets. The performance estimated by our model was evaluated according to the
Algorithm 1, namely, by replacing all the impostor scores with fictitious fake
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Figure 5.5: FAR of the multimodal biometric system as a function of the threshold applied to
the fused score, when the data set does not contain spoof attacks (“no attack” curve), under
a real spoof attack either against the face (top) of fingerprint (bottom) matcher (“real spoof
attack” curve), and under a spoof attack simulated with our method (“simulated attack” curve).
The LLR score fusion rule is used.
scores randomly drawn from the distributions provided by our model (the score
distributions of fake samples are shown in Figure 5.4), and using the α values
of Table 5.3.
Figure 5.5 shows the FAR as a function of threshold for the multimodal
biometric system when no spoof attack is included in the data set (i.e., using
only the genuine and impostor data; the “no attack” curve), under a real spoof
attack either against the face or the fingerprint matcher (using the fake biometric
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Operational Real Approximated
point FAR FAR
Face spoofing zeroFAR 0.025 0.027
1%FAR 0.051 0.089
Fingerprint spoofing zeroFAR 0.052 0.048
1%FAR 0.062 0.063
Table 5.4: Comparison between the FAR attained at the zeroFAR and 1%FAR operational points
by the bi-modal biometric system under a real spoof attack (“real FAR”) and the FAR approxi-
mated by our model (“approximated FAR”).
traits of our data set; the “real spoof attack” curve), and by a simulated spoof
attack (using the fake scores provided by our model with the α values of Table
5.3; the “simulated attack” curve).
It can be seen that our model provides a good approximation of the FAR vs
Threshold curves under a spoof attack, for almost all Threshold values. In the
case of face spoofing (Figure 5.5, top), the difference between the real and the
approximated FAR never exceeds 0.05. In the case of fingerprint spoofing (Fig-
ure 5.5, bottom), our method underestimates the FAR by an amount of about
0.10, for threshold values up to about 0.95. This is due to the skewed distribu-
tion of the real fake fingerprint scores, as can be seen in Figure 5.4 (bottom),
which can be better approximated by a Gamma or Beta distribution rather than
a Gaussian. Note that the FAR in Figure 5.5 of the “no attack” curves is always
very close to zero, except for very low threshold values (this can be better ap-
preciated in the plot at the top of Figure 5.5, thanks to a logarithmic scale for
the threshold values). The reason is that the fingerprint matcher, and thus the
LLR rule, allows to discriminate very well between the genuine and impostor
distributions, as can be seen from Figure 5.1.
We further evaluated the approximation provided by our model, when the
threshold is set on training data in order to attain very low FAR values, which
are the most relevant ones in biometric systems’ security evaluation. We consid-
ered the zeroFAR and 1%FAR operational points, namely the lowest threshold
values which lead to a FAR on training data equal respectively to zero and to
0.01. The results are reported in Table 5.4. It can be seen our model provides
a very good approximation of the performance of the multimodal system in
these operational points. Note that, in the case of fingerprint spoofing, the zero-
FAR and 1%FAR operational points correspond to threshold values above 0.95,
where the approximation of the FAR provided by our model is much better than
the one attained for lower threshold values, as can be seen from Figure 5.5,
5.5. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SECURITY EVALUATION METHOD ON MULTIMODAL
BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS 87
bottom.
The above results show that our method allows providing a good approxima-
tion of the performance of a multimodal system under spoof attacks. This is a
relevant result considering that: our method makes use only of the information
on the genuine and impostor score distributions, which is the only information
usually available for a system designer; it is based on a single parameter attack
strength (α).
5.5.2 Robustness analysis of likelihood ratio score fusion rule
In the previous Sections, we have shown that our method allows to approximate
well a given score distribution of fake biometric traits and it can be used to esti-
mate the performance of a multimodal biometric system under attack. However,
in real applications, the designer does not have a training set of fake traits used
by the attacker.
Therefore, in this Section, we put ourselves in a real scenario, where no
information about spoof attacks is available, but only genuine and impostor dis-
tributions are known. In this case, the designer can use our method to evaluate
the performance of a multimodal biometric system and to analyze for which
values of the “attack strength” his system is robust enough. In particular, we
carried out a case study involving the evaluation of the robustness of multi-
modal systems with the LLR fusion rule. We used Algorithm 1 with parametric
model (Equation 5.3) to evaluate analitically/numerically the robustness of mul-
timodal system against spoof attacks, when the score distributions are modelled
as Gaussians, and the LLR rule is used, as explained in Section 5.3.1.
We used for experiments the NIST Biometric Score Set 1 (NIST BSSR1)
[65], which is a multimodal data set of match scores obtained from three bio-
metric recognition systems: two face recognition systems, named ‘G’ and ‘C’,
respectively, and one fingerprint system applied to two different fingers, namely,
the left index and the right index. Related groups of fingerprint match scores
are called LI (left index) and RI (right index). Thus, match scores of four ver-
ification systems are contained in this data set: face system C, face system G,
fingerprint system LI, and fingerprint system RI. For each individual, one gen-
uine score and 516 impostor scores are available for each matcher and each
modality, on a set of 517 users.
We considered four different multimodal systems by pairing in all possible
ways the scores of the face and fingerprint matchers of the same individual. The
resulting systems are therefore (Face G, Fingerprint LI), (Face G, Fingerprint
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RI), (Face C, Fingerprint LI), and (Face C, Fingerprint RI). In the following
they will be denoted for short with the corresponding symbols: G-LI, G-RI, C-
LI and C-RI. The scores were normalized using the hyperbolic tangent method
[78].
To be able to evaluate the performance degradation due only to a spoof at-
tack, without any component due to a mismatch between the training and testing
sets, in these experiments we used all the available data both as the training and
as the testing set, which corresponds to the ideal situation in which the score
distributions are exactly known. To this aim, we applied Algorithm 1 with
Gts =Gtr, and Its = Itr. In Algorithm 1 we used parametric model with Gaussian
distribution to model the genuine and impostor score distributions, and com-
puted the FAR values under a simulated spoof attack as described in Section
5.3.1.
Three different operational points were considered: 0.01%, 0.1% and 1%
FAR. The values we used for the “attack strength” α range form 0 to 0.1 with
steps of 0.01, plus the values from 0.1 to 1 with steps of 0.1. Note that in this
setting the simulated spoof attacks affect only the FAR, while the FRR remains
unchanged. Accordingly, the robustness of the considered multimodal systems
can be evaluated in terms of the behaviour of their FAR as a function of the
“attack strength”.
Results are reported in Figures 5.6–5.9. These figures show the FAR attained
by the four multimodal systems, for each operational point, as a function of the
“attack strength” (namely, “fake strength”, α), under a simulated spoof attack.
They can be considered a “prediction of the impact, in terms of FAR, of attacks
using fake biometric traits of different quality. It is worth noting that such a
prediction of the impact of a spoof attack can not be obtained with state-of-the-
art performance evaluation methods. Note that the FAR attained for α= 0 is the
one corresponding to the absence of attacks, while the one for α= 1 corresponds
to the “worst-case” considered in [74, 73, 42]. In each plot, we report the results
attained under a simulated spoof attack either on the fingerprint or the face
matcher. Note in particular that using our method it is not possible to compare
the FAR attained under spoof attacks against different biometrics, being equal
the α value, as there is no relationship among the α values related to fake score
distributions of different biometrics.
In all the considered systems, the FAR under spoof attack increases as the
“attack strength” increases, namely as the simulated score distribution of spoof
attack approaches to genuine score distribution.
In particular, we can see, in all plots, that FAR increases very quickly as
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Figure 5.6: FAR (%) of the G–RI system at 0.01 % (top) , 0.1 % (middle) and 1 % FAR
(bottom), as function of the fake strength α, when either the fingerprint (blue curve) or the face
(red curve) is spoofed.
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Figure 5.7: FAR (%) of the G–LI system at 0.01 % (top) , 0.1 % (middle) and 1 % FAR (bottom),
as function of the fake strength, when either the fingerprint (blue curve) or the face (red curve)
is spoofed.
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Figure 5.8: FAR (%) of the C–RI system at 0.01 % (top) , 0.1 % (middle) and 1 % FAR (bottom),
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Figure 5.9: FAR (%) of the C–LI system at 0.01 % (top) , 0.1 % (middle) and 1 % FAR (bottom),
as function of the fake strength, when either the fingerprint (blue curve) or the face (red curve)
is spoofed.
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a function of the “attack strength”, when only fingerprints are spoofed, to the
extent that the FAR becomes unacceptably high even for low α values. For
instance, in the G–RI system with 1% FAR operational point (Figure 5.6, bot-
tom), the FAR under attack exceeds 50% as the fake strength is above 0.15. This
means that 1% of the impostors are erroneously recognised as genuines, when
they provide their real fingerprint and face. Instead, when impostors provide a
spoofed fingerprint of a genuine user together with their real face, 50% of them
would be recognised as genuine users, as long as the mean and variance of the
score distribution of the spoofed fingerprints is shifted from the one of the real
impostors’ fingerprints of just 15% towards the corresponding parameters of
the genuine score distribution. This means, for the attacker, that improving the
quality of the fabrication of fake fingers is very worth, as a slight improvement
of such quality provides a substantial increase of the probability of cracking the
multimodal biometric system.
On the other hand, face spoofing causes instead a relatively more graceful
increase of FAR as a function of the “attack strength”, in all the considered
systems. Nevertheless, it always leads to FAR values exceeding 10%, for a suf-
ficently high fake strength. In our experiments, this is due to the fact that the
genuine and impostor score distributions of the face matchers in the considered
data sets turn out to be more overlapping than the ones produced by the finger-
print matchers. Consequently, for a same value of the fake strength α, when
the face is spoofed, the fingerprint matcher allows to detect a higher fraction of
impostors than vice versa.
All in all, we can conclude that face spoofing is not the best attack strategy
against the considered multimodal biometric systems. The effort of the attacker
for improving the quality of the fake faces does not provide a substantial in-
crease of FAR, namely, a substantial increase of the probability of cracking the
system.
Thus, from the point of view of “attacker”, our results show that the knowl-
edge of which is the most accurate biometric of a multimodal system is a strate-
gic asset. Attacking the most accurate biometric is a very effective and oppor-
tunist strategy. A slight improvement of the quality of the fake traits used can
provide a substantial increase of the probability of cracking the biometric sys-
tem, therefore, the effort of the adversary is compensated very well. On the
other hand, if the attacker does not have this knowledge, she could be obliged
to spoof all the biometrics. In this case, a multimodal system can be a valid
deterrent.
Reported results in particular showed that the LLR rule may be very vul-
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nerable to spoof attacks; despite its theoretical optimality when the genuine
and impostor score distributions are exactly known and there is no attack. The
vulnerability increases as the targeted matcher provides less overlapping score
distributions.
5.5.3 Ranking of score fusion rules under spoof attacks
In Sections 5.5.1–5.5.2, we have shown validation of our proposed models of
the match score distribution produced by spoof attacks on real spoof attacks, on
uni and multimodal systems’ performance estimation under spoof attacks using
our data sets consisting of real spoof attacks, and consequently thus applied
our method to evaluate the robustness of LLR rule in real scenario where only
genuine and impostor distributions are known, but no information about spoof
attacks is available. However, the performance prediction under attack provided
by the above models is useful, only if one can give a reasonable approximation
of the distribution of fake scores that a system will incur, which in practice is
very difficult.
Accordingly, based on the above results, we further proposed to apply our
models to a different, possibly more useful aim: not to predict the FAR of
different score fusion rules under a specific spoof attack, but to predict their
ranking with respect to a range of potential attacks, namely different attack
strength (α) values in the range [0,1], that lead to different (simulated) potential
distributions of fake scores. This can give the designer of a multimodal system
useful information about the relative robustness of different score fusion rules
to spoof attacks characterised by a different “effectiveness”, namely by a fake
score distribution more or less close to the one of genuine scores. The procedure
is summarised in Algorithm 2.
We used Algorithm 2 with non-parametric model (Equation 5.1) to assess
whether our method can accurately predict the ranking of score fusion rules in
terms of their FAR, when the α value that best fits a real fake score distribution
is known, and how a choice between different rules can be made, based on their
predicted robustness across the whole range of attack strength (α) values.
In following experiments we utilized the same data sets used in experiments
of Sections 5.4–5.5.1: silicon spoofed fingerprints and photo attack spoofed
faces data sets. For the investigation we used three fixed score fusion rules
(sum, product and Bayesian) and five trained ones (weighted sum, weighted
product, perceptron, likelihood ratio (LLR), and the extended likelihood ratio
(ExtLLR) of [74]). The Sum, Product, Weighted sum, LLR, and Extended LLR
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(ExtLLR) rules were described in Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1. We describe here
the other rules used in our experiments.
Bayesian [81]. The fused score produced is
f (s1, s2)= s1×s2(1−s1)(1−s2)+(s1×s2);
where s1 and s2 denote scores provided respectively by face and fingerprint
matchers, and s = f (s1, s2) is the score fusion rule.
Weighted product [46]. The fused score is obtained as
f (s1, s2)= sw1 × s1−w2 .
The the value of weights in Weighted sum and Weighted product were set by
maximising the system performance on the chosen operational point, namely,
by minimising the false rejection rate (FRR) on the available data, given the
chosen false acceptance rate (FAR).
Perceptron [54, 53]. The score produced by the Perceptron-based fusion
rule is given by
f (s1, s2)= 11+exp[−(s0+w1s1+w2s2)] ;
where weights w0, w1, and w2 were computed by maximizing the Fisher
distance (Equation 4.4) between the score distributions of genuine and impostor
users.
Since no parameter tuning is required by our method, we used all the avail-
able data both as training and testing sets.
We first report, in Table 5.5, the ranking of the eight score fusion rules con-
sidered, according to the FAR attained on testing data under real spoof attacks
in our data set, at two high security operational points: zeroFAR and 1% FAR
chosen on training data (in absence of spoof attacks).
In order to evaluate the accuracy of our method with non-parametric model
in approximating the FAR of multimodal system under attack, as a function
of α, we report in Table 5.6 the FAR attained by the LLR rule for α values
0.1,0.2, . . . ,1.0, and the ones of Table 5.1 (which minimize the dissimilarity be-
tween the score distributions of real spoof attacks shown in Figure 5.1 and the
one obtained by our method). We can see that our model provides a good ap-
proximation of the real FAR under attack, provided that the optimal α value
is used, in the case of face spoofing. The approximation is not as accurate in
case of fingerprint spoofing: the real FAR is overestimated (when the optimal
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Face Spoofing
zeroFAR 1% FAR
FAR(%) Rules FAR(%) Rules
0.04 ExtLLR 2.26 ExtLLR
0.05 LLR 2.29 LLR
0.27 W. Product 10.72 W. Product
0.48 W. Sum 18.37 W. Sum
1.30 Perceptron 20.95 Perceptron
6.75 Bayesian 23.47 Bayesian
6.80 Sum 23.49 Sum
6.82 Product 23.57 Product
Fingerprint Spoofing
zeroFAR 1% FAR
FAR(%) Rules FAR(%) Rules
0.00 Bayesian 1.05 Bayesian
0.00 Sum 1.15 Sum
0.00 Product 1.33 Product
24.56 W. Sum 42.59 W. Sum
27.73 Perceptron 44.11 Perceptron
34.87 W. Product 51.10 W. Product
50.42 ExtLLR 60.31 ExtLLR
50.43 LLR 60.32 LLR
Table 5.5: Ranking of fusion rules according to their FAR under real spoof attacks, when either
the face (top) or the fingerprint is spoofed (bottom), at two operational points.
α value is used) by an amount of about 16-18%. The FAR predicted by the
worst-case assumption of [74, 73, 42] (corresponding to α= 1) is as accurate as
the one provided by the considered model, for face spoofing, but is much more
inaccurate for fingerprint spoofing, where it overestimates the FAR of about 40
to 50%. This is an evidence that our model is more appropriate than the one
based on the worst-case assumption. Qualitatively similar results were obtained
with the other fusion rules.
It is worth noting that in our data sets fingerprint spoofing leads to a higher
increase of FAR than face spoofing as in experiments, Section 5.5.2, using NIST
BSSR1 biometric benchmark data sets. The is due to the same fact explained
there: genuine and impostor score distributions of the face matcher turned out
to be more overlapping than the ones produced by the fingerprint matcher.
We can see that FAR increases, unfortunately, very quickly as a function of
α (attack strength) in the case of fingerprint spoofing, up to the extent that the
performance drops considerably even for low α values. This suggests, as also
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Face Spoofing
α = 0 zeroFAR 1% FAR
0.1 0.00 1.09
0.2 0.00 1.15
0.3 0.01 1.26
0.4 0.01 1.35
0.5 0.01 1.45
0.6 0.01 1.59
0.7 0.01 1.76
0.8 0.02 2.01
0.9 0.04 2.24
0.9144 0.04 2.33
1 0.06 2.68
Realistic attack 0.05 2.29
Fingerprint Spoofing
α = 0 zeroFAR 1% FAR
0.0522 66.04 78.04
0.1 86.94 91.28
0.2 95.06 97.28
0.3 97.90 99.08
0.4 99.12 99.43
0.5 99.34 99.70
0.6 99.63 99.79
0.7 99.73 99.84
0.8 99.75 99.86
0.9 99.76 99.87
1 99.85 99.89
Realistic attack 50.43 60.32
Table 5.6: FAR (%) attained by the multimodal system under a simulated spoof attack against
the face (top) and the fingerprint matcher (bottom), as a function of α, using LLR rule, at two
operational points. The FAR under the α value that best fitted the real fake score distributions
(see Table 5.1) is shown in boldface.
explained in Section 5.5.2, that the LLR rule, which in principle is the optimal
fusion rule under normal operational conditions, can be very vulnerable to spoof
attacks. Similar results were observed for the other fusion rules.
As, we have seen that the our method can give a better prediction of the FAR
than the one based on the worst-case assumption, but this prediction can nev-
ertheless be quite inaccurate. Thus, to assess how well our method (Algorithm
2) predicts the ranking of score fusion rules, we first compared the real rank-
ing of Table 5.5, and the one predicted by the Algorithm 2 with non-parametric
98
CHAPTER 5. METHOD FOR EVALUATING THE SECURITY OF MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC
SYSTEMS AGAINST SPOOF ATTACKS
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Attack Strength
R
a
n
k
in
g
 
 
Bayesian
Sum
Product
W. Sum
Perceptron
W. Product
ExtLLR
LLR
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Attack Strength
R
a
n
k
in
g
 
 
Bayesian
Sum
Product
W. Sum
Perceptron
W. Product
ExtLLR
LLR
Figure 5.10: Ranking of the considered fusion rules as a function of attack strength α, when
only face (top) or fingerprint (bottom) is spoofed, at the zeroFAR and 1% FAR (the ranking was
identical for both operational points).
model for the optimal α value of Table 5.1. We found that our method always
predicted the correct ranking corresponding to the optimal α value. This is an
evidence that our method is capable to provide a reliable ranking prediction for
any given α value, if the fake score distribution is best approximated by our
model using such value.
Since in practice a multimodal system can be subject to different attacks,
that are best approximated by different α values, and that such attack strength
(α) values are unknown. Subsequently, we investigated whether the ranking of
score fusion rules predicted by our method (Algorithm 2) changes smoothly,
for smooth changes of the fake score distribution, namely, of the parameter α.
The ranking predicted for the eight considered score fusion rules as a function
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of attack strength α is reported in Figure 5.10 for the zeroFAR and 1% FAR
operational points (the ranking was identical for both operational points). These
results suggests that our method can nevertheless be used to choose the score
fusion rule that exhibits the highest “average” robustness across the whole range
of attack α values. To better understand this point, we can observe that under
fingerprint spoofing the predicted ranking of each rule remains constant, and
identical to the one under the real spoof attack (see Table 5.5, bottom). Note in
Figure 5.10 (bottom) that Bayesian rule always exhibits the best ranking. This
suggests that the Bayesian rule should be a good choice in terms of robustness,
even if the designer does not know the optimal attack strength (α) value for any
given spoof attack.
For face spoofing, two different rankings are predicted instead: one for α<
0.5, and the other α ≥ 0.5. The latter corresponds to the one observed under a
real spoof attacks (Table 5.5, top). We can see that Bayesian and ExtLLR rules
are the top-ranking ones in the two intervals, respectively. However, except for
the weighted sum and weighted product rules, that exhibit a constant or almost
constant, and rather high ranking in both intervals, the ranking of the other
rules drastically changes. This suggests that the weighted sum or the weighted
product rule is a reasonable choice to avoid the risk of a very low performance
under attack, unless the fake score distribution of possible face spoofing attacks
is believed to be either close to the impostor one (namely, it is best approximated
by a low α value), in which case the Bayesian rule is the best choice, or it is
believed to be close to the genuine user distribution, and in this case the ExtLLR
rule is the best choice.
All in all, we can conclude that even if the designer does not know the “op-
timal” attack strength (α) value for a given attack, and thus can not obtain an
accurate prediction of the corresponding FAR, he could nevertheless obtain a
reliable prediction of the ranking of different fusion rules. In other words, using
our method the ranking of different score fusion rules under a range of spoof
attacks can be predicted more reliably than their exact performance. This is a
potentially useful information for the choice of a fusion rule based also on its
robustness against spoof attacks.
5.6 Summary
Evaluating the robustness of multimodal biometric systems under spoof attacks
is a crucial issue, do to the fact that replicating biometrics is a real menace. The
state-of-the-art solves this problem by simulating the effect of a spoof attacks
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in terms of fake score distribution modelling, for each individual matcher. In
particular, the fake score distribution is assumed to be coincident to the genuine
users one, thus drawing a “worst-case” scenario.
However, a more realistic modelling should take into account a larger set of
cases. Unfortunately, the approach of fabricating fake biometric traits to evalu-
ate the performance of a biometric system under different real spoof attacks is
impractical. Thus, in this chapter we proposed a method for evaluating empir-
ically or analitically/numerically the robustness of multimodal systems against
spoof attacks, based on simulating the corresponding score distribution, and
then consequently we proposed extension of our method to rank the different
biometric score fusion rules according to their relative robustness against spoof
attacks. Indeed, we proposed two models (non-parametric and parametric) of
the score distributions produced by the spoof attacks, that accounts for different
possible degrees of the quality of the fake traits, which in real scenarios can
be due to different forgery skills of the attackers etc., thus resulting in different
degrees of similarity between the genuine and the fake score distribution. Such
factors are summarized in our models in a single parameter associated to the
degree of similarity of the fake score distribution to the genuine one, which is
named accordingly “attack strength” (α). A designer may use this method to
generate several fake distributions for different α values, to analyze the robust-
ness of the multimodal system under design.
We reported experimental results to provide some evidence that our models
are capable to give reasonable approximations of score distributions produced
by real spoof attacks, and also to be a good alternative to the model based on
the “worst-case” scenario adopted so far. We then also presented an extensive
experimental analysis involving unimodal and multimodal biometric systems
based on data set of faces and fingerprints with real spoof attacks, to show
how our proposed methodology can be used reliably to assess the systems’ ro-
bustness against attacks. In particular, we applied our robustness evaluation
method to a case study involving multimodal systems made up by a face and
a fingerprint matcher, whose scores are fused using the well known LLR rule.
Eventually, we present an experimental analysis, using our proposed method of
ranking biometric score fusion rules in terms of their robustness against spoof
attacks, to provide further evidence that our method is also capable of predicting
dependably the raking of fusion rules. Although our work was mainly focused
on performance analysis, and no countermeasures against spoof attacks were
explicitly proposed, we believe that our findings may not only help system de-
signers and researchers to evaluate the current impact of spoof attacks, but also
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to devise more reliable robust fusion rules and multimodal biometric systems.
To sum up, from the point of view of the “attacker”, our results show that the
knowledge of which is the most accurate biometric of a multimodal system is
a strategic asset. Attacking the most accurate biometric is a very effective and
opportunist strategy. A slight improvement of the quality of the fake traits used
can provide a substantial increase of the probability of cracking the biometric
system, therefore, the effort of the adversary is compensated very well. On the
other hand, if the attacker does not have this knowledge, she could be obliged to
spoof all the biometrics. In this case, a multimodal system can be a valid deter-
rent. While from the point of view of the “designer” of a biometric system, our
empirical results should make him aware that multimodal systems can be highly
vulnerable when only a subset of biometric traits is spoofed, and therefore they
can not be considered intrinsically robust to spoof attacks as commonly be-
lieved so far. In particular, the degree of vulnerability turns out to depend on
factors such as the accuracy of the biometric trait subject to a spoof attack, score
fusion rule and the quality of the fakes fabricated by the attacker; the success
of the spoof attack can strongly depend on such quality. In addition, our results
show that the designer should consider very carefully the choice of the score
fusion rule, being aware that fusion rules which are optimal when the system is
not under attack could be very vulnerable to spoof attacks, even if such attacks
are carried out by non-professional attackers who use fake biometrics of low
quality, namely low “attack strength” (α). This highlights the importance of
tools for performance evaluation like the ones proposed in this chapter as well
as developing defence strategies, for multimodal systems, against spoof attacks
like the one is [74], i.e., devising ad-hoc score fusion rules. All work presented
in this chapter can be found in detail in [4, 3, 5].

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Conclusions
Biometric identity recognition is a pattern recognition application with a po-
tential adversarial nature. Such adversarial nature comes from the fact that a
malicious user (referred to as “impostor” in the biometric literature) may try to
be recognized by a biometric system as a genuine one by purposely carrying out
actions (“attacks”) aimed at undermining the expected working of the system,
possibly by exploiting some system’s vulnerability. Security against attacks of
malicious users (so-called “impostor”) is a major problem for the widespread
use of biometric systems for identity management. While biometric recognition
systems are increasingly being applied to many real-world security applications,
the research efforts on this topic are still at a very early stage. They need a sys-
tematization and a uniform treatment, toward the development of a clear theo-
retical framework of practical design methods for biometric recognition systems
in adversarial environments. This thesis provides some contributions towards
this direction.
Among the potential attacks discussed in the literature, the one with the
greatest practical relevance consists in submitting a fake biometric trait to a
biometric system. This attack is known as “spoof attack” (also named “direct
attack” since it is carried out directly on the biometric sensor). Spoof attacks
have a great practical relevance because they don’t require advanced technical
skills and, therefore, the potential number of attackers is very large. Although
several potential counter measures have been proposed so far, like fingerprint
“liveness” detection, no effective solution exists yet.
Besides, ad hoc countermeasures, multimodal biometric systems are also
considered as a defense technique against spoof attacks. Multimodal systems
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have been originally proposed to overcome the weaknesses of using any in-
dividual biometric trait, and to consequently improve the identity recognition
performance. It is commonly believed that multimodal systems are more robust
against spoof attacks than systems using a single biometric. The claimed su-
perior robustness of multimodal systems against spoof attacks is based on the
intuitive argument that their evasion would require to spoof all biometric traits
simultaneously.
However, the robustness of multimodal biometric systems has been ques-
tioned very recently. It has been shown that, in some application scenarios,
multimodal systems can be cracked by spoofing only one of the biometric traits.
In Chapter 3, we made an in-depth analysis of several works in multimodal bio-
metric system, according to their security in adversarial environments, namely,
(1) performance evaluation, with particular focus on the concept of robustness
under spoof attack, and (2) design of robust multimodal systems. This state-of-
the-art works in multimodal systems under spoof attacks highlighted the need
for a more thoroughly, systematic and unifying analysis and development of
mutlimodal biometric systems under spoof attacks.
The scopes of state-of-the-art results of multimodal systems against spoof at-
tacks are very limited, since they were obtained under the unrealistic hypothesis
known as “worst-case” scenario, where the attacker is able to fabricate a perfect
replica of a biometric trait whose matching score distribution is identical to the
one of genuine traits. Therefore, we argued and investigated in Chapter 4 that
the “worst-case” scenario may not hold in realistic case. We provided empirical
evidence that a “worst-case” scenario can not be representative of real spoof
attacks: its suitability may depend on the specific biometric trait, the matching
algorithm, and the techniques used to fabricate the spoofed traits. In particular,
we found that the “worst-case” assumption can be too pessimistic, resulting in
a significant overestimation of performance drop that a multimodal system may
incur under a real spoof attack. This can also undermine the effectiveness of
robust score fusion rules based on such assumption. In addition, our analysis
on real spoof attacks provided evidence of two common beliefs about the ro-
bustness of multimodal biometric systems. First, they can be more robust than
each corresponding unimodal system, even in the case when all biometric traits
are spoofed. Second, they can be cracked by spoofing all the fused traits, even
when the attacker is not able to fabricate an exact replica of the genuine user’s
traits.
In Chapter 5, we then proposed a method to evaluate the security/robustness
of a multimodal biometric system against spoof attacks. Since the straightfor-
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ward approach fabricating fake biometric traits to test the security of a biometric
system is impractical for the system designer, we proposed a method for the se-
curity evaluation that does not require to fabricate fake traits. In particular, we
proposed two models of the match score distribution of fake biometric traits,
that accounts for different possible realistic scenarios characterized by factors
like different spoofing techniques and attackers’ capability etc. Such factors
are summarized in our models in a single parameter associated to the degree of
similarity of the fake score distribution to the genuine one, which is named ac-
cordingly “attack strength”. The proposed models exploit only information on
genuine and impostor samples which is collected for the training of a biometric
system. The main feature of our method is that it allows analyzing the per-
formance of a multimodal system against several spoof attack distributions for
different “attack strength” values, namely non-worst case scenarios. Our mod-
els allow to develop a method to empirically or analitically/numerically evaluate
the security of biometric systems against attacks, by simulating their effect on
the match scores. The proposed method can be applied to any multimodal sys-
tem, namely, to any set of matchers combined with any score fusion rule, and
it allows to simulate a spoof attack against any subset of the component match-
ers. Furthermore, we proposed extension of security evaluation method aimed
at ranking several score-level fusion rules under attack, to allow the designer to
choose the most robust one according to the method predictions.
We then provided empirical validation of our models of the fake score dis-
tribution on data sets of face and fingerprint images, including images of fake
traits exhibiting a very different quality. Our models provided a good approxi-
mation of the real fake score distribution, and of the performance of unimodal
and multimodal systems under a real spoof attack. We also carried out a set
of experiments, on large and publicly data sets without spoof attack samples,
aimed at showing some concrete examples of application of our method to as-
sess the performance of multimodal system under spoof attacks. Eventually,
we provided empirical evidence using data set containing real spoof attacks that
our method can rank correctly score-level fusion rules under spoof attacks.
To sum up, in this thesis we highlighted the main problems related to secu-
rity of multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks, and proposed some
possible techniques which can be exploited to evaluate robustness of biometric
systems under design and also to select the most robust score fusion rule under
attacks. In principle, the proposed techniques are completely general, that is to
say, they are not tailored neither to a specific biometric trait nor kind of bio-
metric system, although their specific implementation has to take into account,
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clearly, particular application constraints and requirements. We argue that our
contributions are a first step toward the systematisation of the problem of se-
curity of multimodal systems against spoof attacks, which is however far from
being completely investigated yet. In other words, research in the security of
multimodal biometric systems against attacks is still at an early stage.
6.2 Future Research Directions
A number of theoretical and empirical research directions arise from the work
carried out in this Thesis. The following ones are of special interest:
1. We believe that the techniques proposed in this thesis can be further ex-
panded and refined by constructing proper data sets containing spoof at-
tacks, to analyze the behavior of the real distribution of fake scores under
different conditions (different biometric traits, spoofing techniques, match-
ers, etc.). This would allow one to check whether the assumptions under-
lying our models provide good approximations of the fake score distri-
butions, and to modify them if necessary. As a consequence, this would
allow further to improve the effectiveness of the proposed method for se-
curity evaluation a practical tool for the designers of biometric systems,
without requiring the actual implementation of spoof attacks.
2. Since the proposed method allows to point out the vulnerabilities of mul-
timodal biometric score fusion rules to spoof attacks, it could be exploited
to develop proper countermeasure to improve their robustness.
3. Our results also highlighted the need of methods, like the one proposed
in this work, for evaluating and comparing the performance of different
multimodal biometric systems against spoof attacks. Such methods will
also play a crucial role in the development of new score fusion rules that
aim to be robust to spoof attacks, as they will allow to evaluate their actual
robustness.
4. The traditional design process of multimodal biometric systems consists
in the following steps: collecting a set of labelled samples, choosing a set
of features from respective biometric traits(possibly selecting or extracting
a feature subset), choosing a fusion rule, training the chosen rule using a
given learning algorithm, and estimating its performance on testing sam-
ples. In general, all these steps should be revisited to take into account
the presence of spoof attacks, as we did in this thesis for performance
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evaluation. For instance, feature selection should not be carried out only
looking for the highest generalisation capability, but features should be se-
lected also on the basis of their vulnerability to attacks. Indeed, it may
be more difficult to modify the features to evade the system, if more ro-
bust features are selected. Analogously, feature extraction algorithms have
to be designed from the scratch to be as secure as possible. As, the fea-
tures quickly loose their discriminant capability due to spoof attacks. To
counteract, the system should be constantly updated by the designers, typ-
ically by re-training or by adding new features (i.e., updating the feature
extraction and matching algorithm). These procedures need to be fast and
computationally efficient, and, if possible, they should be automated. For
instance, some automatic technique may be exploited for detecting when
the system performance may incur a significant degradation, and to con-
sequently re-training the system, or demanding for new features selection
algorithm. To this aim, concept drift, unsupervised learning, and active
learning techniques may be exploited.
5. Future efforts should also be directed to design or model adversary aware
biometric classifiers. Adversary aware classifiers utilize adversarial pat-
tern classification techniques to remain robust to spoof attacks. The ro-
bustness may be attained by adapting the training set or fusion methods on
injecting the spoof attacks to the system. The design of such an optimal
and robust biometric systems will substancially advance the state-of-the-
art in this field.
To conclude, we hope that the contributions of this thesis will capture the
attention of the scientific community, since it is a great opportunity and chal-
lenge to improve the research in this field. Biometric recognition systems as
security systems neither have been tried at such large scales nor have they dealt
with such a wide use of sensitive personal information, and thus demand rises
for a more secure implementation of the systems, as well as new techniques to
address open issues like the ones mentioned above.
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